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Deregulation Defanged: An Empirical Review of 
Federal Deregulatory Policy and its Legal Obstacles 
Jack Thorlin* 
^Äëíê~Åí=
The federal government has embarked on a major deregulatory 
push since 2017, but summarizing its effects has proven difficult. 
Federal agencies issue cost-benefit analyses of specific deregulatory 
actions, but courts have struck down several of the proposed rule 
changes, and state governments have taken countervailing action 
against others. To obtain a clear understanding of the overall effec-
tiveness of the Trump administration’s deregulatory efforts, this arti-
cle provides a rigorous, empirical review of deregulatory actions tak-
en and the countervailing effect of judicial actions and state 
governments. 
Methodological problems have plagued estimates of overall 
Trump administration regulatory savings, most of which have come 
from right-leaning sources in and out of government. The White 
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for example, re-
leases the authoritative federal accounting of deregulatory savings. 
However, its approach is overly simplistic, includes rules that are de-
regulatory in only a technical sense, and examines only the present 
value of anticipated future savings. Examining only present value as-
sumes that all future expected regulatory savings will materialize, an 
assumption that requires no intervention by the judiciary or state 
governments. As we will see, this assumption is unwarranted. 
Through this accounting approach, OMB has claimed $23 billion in 
overall savings from deregulation over an indefinite time horizon, 
amounting to $1.6 billion annually, but a closer review finds only 
around $131 to $261 million in actual annual savings through the end 
of fiscal year 2018. An empirical examination of less tangible “soft” 
benefits of deregulation—e.g., the decreased expectation of future 
 
* Adjunct professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center.  
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
334 
regulation by businesses—yields no clear evidence of deregulatory ef-
fect beyond the savings identified in specific deregulatory actions. 
Anticipated actions by courts and the governments of pro-
regulation states against upcoming or ongoing major deregulatory ac-
tions suggest the bottom line of federal deregulatory savings esti-
mates will not change dramatically in the near future. The totality of 
the evidence thus suggests the administration’s deregulatory efforts 
have not and will not meaningfully alter the country’s economic 
growth. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that the 
Trump administration’s deregulatory campaign has been ineffective 
and is unlikely to improve. 
fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
The Trump administration and Republican leaders in Congress 
frequently cite deregulation as a major cause of the current period of 
economic growth.1 However, there has been almost no serious gen-
eral accounting of deregulation under the Trump administration. 
That is largely due to regulatory cost being a complex and highly 
partisan issue. Right-leaning think tanks have put forward triumphal-
ist estimates with little credibility, while academics have generally fo-
cused critiques more on specific deregulatory actions than on overall 
regulatory burden reduction.2 Neither vague triumphalist estimates 
nor analyses of specific regulations truly address the salient question: 
is the deregulatory agenda significantly driving economic growth? 
This article contributes to answering that question with a rigorous 
empirical approach to assessing (a) projected savings from deregula-
tory actions and (b) the effect of judicial and state-level interventions 
that have weakened federal deregulatory action. 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 2, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1123987855053873154 (“Tax Cuts [] and deregu-
lation [] have produced non-inflationary prosperity for all Americans.”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Harrington, Report: Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in 
Regulatory Savings, WASH. FREE BEACON (April 20, 2017), https://freebeacon.com/issues/ 
report-trump-rolls-back-60-billion-regulatory-savings/ (citing the think tank American Action 
Forum for the proposition that the Trump administration has saved “an additional $60 billion 
in regulatory costs” within the first three months of the administration despite OMB itself 
claiming $23 billion by the end of fiscal year 2018 over an indefinite time horizon). For a gen-
eral, qualitative assessment of Trump administration regulatory savings, see Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride: Business Deregulation in the Trump Era, 70 MERCER L. 
REV. 587 (2019) (describing the landscape of regulatory change under President Trump from a 
more qualitative and less empirical vantage). 
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Understanding the change in overall regulatory costs first re-
quires an examination of where overall regulatory costs were at the 
beginning of the Trump administration. Both the administration and 
the Trump campaign cited studies placing the annual federal regula-
tory burden—the total economic cost of complying with federal 
regulations—at about $2 trillion.3 The campaign claimed it would re-
duce the regulatory burden by $200 billion annually.4 The admin-
istration has publicly announced $23 billion in total future savings 
from the deregulatory actions taken to date, which translates to about 
$1.6 billion in annual savings.5 Needless to say, $1.6 billion is a negli-
gible dent in $2 trillion, a reduction slightly less than a tenth of one 
percent. However, on March 19, 2019, the White House announced: 
“The Trump administration has rolled back business killing regula-
tions to unleash an economic boom across all sectors of the econo-
my.”6 Either something more must be at work than the specific sav-
ings cited, or the administration is dramatically overstating the effect 
of deregulation. 
There are several potential explanations for the administration’s 
apparently misplaced enthusiasm. The regulatory burden might not 
actually be as high as $2 trillion, so even if the Trump administration 
is cutting a significant portion of the burden, it does not amount to 
large savings. Alternatively, the Trump administration might be un-
dercounting deregulatory savings. After all, its estimates include only 
the specific federal estimates for savings from the repeal of particular 
rules. It is entirely possible that the decreased expectation of future 
regulation among the business community accounts for much higher 
savings than the repeal of a few specific rules. 
 
 3.  Peter Navarro, Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory & Energy 
Policy Impacts, at 6 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Trump_Economic 
_Plan.pdf. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Alan Levin and Alyza Sebenius, Trump Claims $1.6 Billion a Year Saved from Cut-
ting Red Tape, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
10-17/trump-administration-claims-23-billion-in-regulation-savings.  
 6.  Press Release, White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Economic Agenda is 
Working for All Americans,” (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trumps-economic-agenda-working-americans/. Adding to the 
confusion, the White House stated, “The Trump Administration’s regulatory reform efforts 
have saved American families and businesses $23 billion in Fiscal Year 2018.” Levin & Sebeni-
us, supra note 5. 
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To resolve the apparent paradox, we must take a closer look at 
various estimates for overall regulatory burden and Trump admin-
istration deregulatory actions. At the level of overall regulatory bur-
den, two general methods for calculating regulatory costs produce 
wildly varying estimates: (1) tallying the specific costs of individual 
rules, and (2) using survey or econometric tools to produce an esti-
mate of the overall regulatory burden. The first approach is more 
grounded in specific measurable economic facts, but omits entirely 
the more difficult-to-quantify benefits of deregulation, notably the 
reduced expectation of future regulation and the avoided costs of dis-
continued regulatory efforts that did not culminate in actual rule-
makings. The second approach can capture those harder-to-quantify 
benefits. However, the difficulty of isolating deregulatory effects ne-
cessitates using statistical methods that are prone to misuse or abuse 
by partisan entities. Bluntly, the organizations that have used the sec-
ond approach often appear to have done so in order to reach their 
own preferred conclusion on regulatory costs.7 
Similar methodological problems have plagued estimates of the 
Trump administration’s regulatory savings. Partisan entities have 
used inconsistent or nonsensical methods to come up with extreme 
estimates that are then passed on by friendly media outlets without 
necessary caveats.8 The federal government itself issues tallies of the 
economic impact of individual new regulations that are more reliable 
than broad estimates, yet the federal tallies can be simultaneously 
over- and underinclusive. They do not include savings from de-
creased expectations of regulation, and are thus underinclusive. How-
ever, because of imprecise definitions of “deregulation,” the formal 
tallies can also count actions that do not fit a classical understanding 
of the term. Some ostensibly “deregulatory” actions taken by the ad-
ministration were either initiated by the Obama administration or are 
deregulatory only in a technical sense, such as rules relaxing eligibil-
ity for special Medicare reimbursement rates.9 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of All Cost 
of Regulation Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway (Jan. 8, 2017) (Competitive 
Enterprise Inst., Working Paper, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2502883 (exhibiting a clear anti-regulation bias while using dubious statistical meth-
ods to reach an outlier conclusion regarding the total cost of federal regulations). 
 8.  See infra, Section I(C)(ii). 
 9.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 414 (Nov. 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-
2017-11-16/2017-24067. 
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To obtain a neutral, non-partisan estimate for overall savings, in 
this article I examine “hard” deregulatory benefits—the federal agen-
cies’ savings estimates for specific deregulatory actions—and “soft” 
benefits that accrue from decreased private sector expectation of reg-
ulation. Establishing “hard” benefits simply requires a review of 
OMB’s estimate, screening out rules that do not reasonably fit the 
definition of “deregulation” because they control access to federal 
subsidies rather than govern the behavior of private sector entities. 
This analysis suggests $131 to $261 million in annual savings as of 
the end of fiscal year 2018, with highly uncertain future additions 
possible as additional major deregulatory acts are finalized and make 
their way through legal challenges. While establishing a precise esti-
mate for “soft” benefits is essentially impossible, I review the availa-
ble evidence for soft benefits and the factors that are likely weakening 
these types of benefits. I conclude that there is no evidence for signif-
icant “soft” benefits. 
This suggests that the Trump administration’s deregulatory 
agenda is not having a significant effect on the economy as a whole. 
Even taking the maximum “hard” deregulatory savings estimate, 
$261 million annually is roughly one-thousandth of one percent of 
current U.S. GDP.10 It is about one-tenth of the unrecoverable cost 
of the partial government shutdown of December 2018 – January 
2019.11 However, the ubiquity of the deregulatory talking point 
among right-wing politicians and commentators suggests the deregu-
latory agenda serves important non-economic ends. Among the ex-
planations I explore are the unification of the Republican Party and 
gratifying politically important constituencies. 
In Part I, I describe and evaluate various existing empirical 
measures for the overall regulatory burden and deregulatory actions 
taken to date under President Trump. Using insight gained from the 
review of existing literature, in Part II, I present my neutral estimates 
for “hard” and “soft” deregulatory benefits, factoring in empirical da-
ta on judicial review of agency actions and state government inter-
 
 10.  Interactive Access to Industry Economic Accounts Data: GDP by Industry, U.S. 
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Jan. 9, 2020), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm? 
ReqID=51&step=1. 
 11.  Caitlin Emma & Jennifer Scholtes, Shutdown Costs the U.S. 3 Billion That Won’t 
Be Recovered, CBO says, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2019/01/28/government-shutdown-cost-1123735. 
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ventions. In Part III, I discuss possible non-economic motives for the 
deregulatory agenda which may explain the contradiction between 




The first step of the investigation into the economic effect of 
President Trump’s deregulatory agenda is reviewing existing studies 
of the overall regulatory burden and the economic effect of recent 
deregulatory actions. Recent studies place the overall federal regula-
tory burden—the cost of complying with federal regulations—within 
a range of $78 billion to $2.028 trillion annually.12 Estimates for 
Trump administration regulatory savings range from $1.6 billion an-
nually (the administration’s estimate) to perhaps as much as $86 bil-
lion in the administration’s first year (the estimate of one right-
leaning think tank, as relayed by conservative media sources).13 The 
absurdly broad sweep of these ranges strongly suggests the need for a 
new approach. Examining the apparent flaws in the studies produced 
to date should help us craft a better methodology. 
A.  Why are Regulatory Costs So Hard to Pin Down? 
Empirical measurement of regulatory costs is inherently subjec-
tive and difficult to specify in a neutral fashion. Even coming up with 
a definition for regulatory cost can be surprisingly challenging. It is 
simple to say that “regulatory costs” are the total cost to the govern-
ment of enforcing a rule and to private entities of following it, but the 
lines get blurry at the level of federal regulations. Should we count 
 
 12.  See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT, at 2 (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf [hereinafter 2017 DRAFT 
REPORT] (estimating $78 billion annually as the low end of the regulatory burden range); see 
also Mark Crain & Nicole Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manu-
facturing and Small Business, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS (Sept. 10, 2014), 
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20150323014159/https://www.nam.org/data-and-repo 
rts/cost-of-federal-regulations/federal-regulation-full-study.pdf (estimating $2.028 trillion as 
the annual regulatory burden). 
 13.  Tim Devaney, Study: Trump Has Eliminated $86B in Regs, THE HILL (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://thehill.com/regulation/329720-study-trump-has-eliminated-86b-in-regs. 
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the costs of “self-regulation,” where expensive measures might be 
adopted by businesses to forestall regulation by a government entity? 
How do we count the decreased expectation of future costs due to a 
general presumption against new regulation in a particular admin-
istration? 
1.  Deepwater Horizon: a window into empirical problems with 
regulatory costs 
One recent example helps illustrate the definitional problems. In 
the aftermath of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP, the oil 
conglomerate that operated the compromised oil rig, spent $17.7 bil-
lion on response activities, and invested more in its internal inde-
pendent safety and operational risk management group.14 BP pre-
sented those actions as voluntary, just part of being a good corporate 
citizen. However, the Obama administration also put in place regula-
tions such as the Well Control Rule, finalized in April 2016.15 It 
placed specific requirements on the operation of blowout preventers, 
the safety valve that failed on the Deepwater Horizon rig.16 The 
Trump administration quickly proposed a partial repeal of that rule, 
claiming that the change would save the offshore oil industry $946 
million over ten years.17 
If one were keeping a table comparing regulatory costs between 
the two administrations, how would one apportion costs? Though 
neither administration included the cost of BP’s voluntary measures 
in its regulatory cost estimates, the $17.7 billion BP spent on remedi-
al activities is, in some sense, a regulatory cost. Had BP not made 
those efforts, a federal regulator or a court would likely have forced 
them to do something. If the expenditures were made pursuant to a 
court order, it would seem strange to put those costs on the Obama 
 
 14.  Sustainability Review, BP, at 7, 16 (2010), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-
country/en_ru/documents/publications_PDF_eng/bp_sustainability_review_2010_eng.pdf. 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160420152154/]. 
 15.  Wendy Becktold, Proposed Changes to Safety Rule Suggest Influence of Offshore 
Drilling Industry, SIERRA CLUB (May 14, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/proposed-
changes-key-safety-rule-Well-Control-Rule-suggest-influence-offshore-drilling-industry. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  U.S. BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, INTERIOR, OIL AND GAS 
AND SULFUR OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF—BLOWOUT PREVENTER 
SYSTEMS AND WELL CONTROL REVISIONS, 92 Fed. Reg. 22128 (May 2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05-11/pdf/2018-09305.pdf. 
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administration, which had no oversight over the courts. However, it 
is probably true on some level that the Obama administration was 
more likely to strictly regulate BP, which likely spurred BP to make 
additional expenditures. The tallying of those costs within the 
Obama administration would then require a number of complicated 
allowances. 
The simplest way to tally the costs is the way the administrations 
actually did estimate the costs, counting only the estimated cost of 
compliance with new federal regulations at the time those rules were 
adopted. When the Obama administration finalized the rule, it esti-
mated the cost would be $858 million to $1 billion over ten years.18 
Through deregulation of part of the Well Control rule, the Trump 
administration projects a decrease in costs of $946 million over ten 
years.19 
That methodology is clean but does not at all describe the actual 
economic effect of the regulation. The Obama administration clearly 
did not impose $946 million in actual costs, especially since the rule 
was only in place starting in April 2016 with seven months to go in 
the Obama presidency. It certainly intended to impose those costs, 
but the actual economic effect was far less. President Trump also did 
not repeal the entire rule, so some portion of the regulatory costs will 
continue with his administration’s implicit blessing. Should his ad-
ministration then be on the hook for those costs? For how long? The 
duration of a presidency? If we use that measure, then the Trump 
administration’s imposed costs could easily exceed the Obama admin-
istration’s even for a rule imposed by the Obama administration that 
the Trump administration successfully repealed. But if duration of a 
presidency is not appropriate, what is? Ten years? Forever? 
2.  Requirements for useful methodology 
We are left with an unpalatable reality: assigning cost responsibil-
ity for regulations is fundamentally an exercise in arbitrariness. But 
that does not mean that all assessments are created equal. Rather, an 
assessment of regulatory cost is only worthwhile if it is (a) uniform in 
methodology between administrations, (b) presented and discussed 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 22145. 
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consistent with the methodology, and (c) not deliberately chosen to 
reach a desired conclusion. 
Consistent methodology is easy to explain, yet surprisingly rare in 
practice. Comparing finalized actions for the Obama administration 
and proposed actions for Trump would be misleading.20 Similarly, re-
lying on survey data from small businesses to estimate Obama-era 
regulatory costs is not comparable to using agency-estimated regula-
tory costs for the Trump administration. 
When one examines general regulatory cost studies, the presenta-
tion and discussion of regulatory cost estimates almost never corre-
sponds to the study’s methodology. Imagine, for example, that a reg-
ulation proposed in 2016 is expected to cost $10 billion over ten 
years. A think tank issues a report at the end of 2016 claiming that 
the administration has imposed $10 billion in new regulatory costs in 
2016. A new administration comes into office in 2017 and rescinds 
the regulation. The same think tank says that the new administration 
saved $10 billion. The actual truth of the underlying matter is that no 
new costs were imposed by the previous administration and no costs 
were avoided—the rule never went into effect. The presentation con-
flated actual costs with projected costs. 
Self-serving methodologies pervade the arena of regulatory esti-
mates. The most obvious example of this is comparing the final year 
of an administration with the first year of a new administration.21 A 
new administration will not have time to finalize any major regulato-
ry or deregulatory actions within one year. An outgoing administra-
tion will have had eight years to propose regulations and ordinarily 
will not propose a major new regulation in its final year. Thus, in its 
final year, it will be mostly finalizing regulations, precisely what a 
 
 20.  See, e.g., Diane Katz, Here’s How Much Red Tape Trump Has Cut, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/ 
heres-how-much-red-tape-trump-has-cut. The study claims President Obama put rules in place 
costing $122 billion annually, while President Trump saved $23 billion in 2018 alone. The cita-
tion for the Trump numbers leads to an OIRA publication, which does not explain where the 
overall numbers come from other than to cite to a list of deregulatory actions. Many of those 
actions are proposed rulemakings, not finalized rules. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, REGULATORY REFORM REPORT: COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 
(2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_Actions_for_ Fis-
cal_Year_2018.pdf. 
 21.  See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, So, What Regulations Did Trump Eliminate?, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://cei.org/blog/so-what-regulations-
did-trump-eliminate. 
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new administration will not be doing. If one wanted to maximize 
costs of the previous administration and minimize costs of the new, 
all it would take would be to put on methodological blinders and look 
at finalized regulations. 
B.  Overall Regulatory Burden 
To produce an estimate of Trump-specific regulatory cost reduc-
tions, it is helpful to first understand the overall regulatory burden. 
Conceptually, this is the cost to the country as a whole of complying 
with every rule established or policed by a federal agency—the com-
bined costs to the federal government of implementing the rule and 
to the private sector of complying with the rule. The overall burden 
produces a logical cap on the amount of savings we could reasonably 
attribute to President Trump. If the overall burden is $78 billion an-
nually—a low-end estimate endorsed by the federal government—it 
is logically impossible that President Trump cut the burden by $86 
billion during his first year in office. 
While I endeavor to address each estimate from behind a veil of 
ignorance as to the political ends of its affiliated organization, I sus-
pect most of the estimates ultimately fail because their authors are 
not attempting to dispassionately analyze regulatory costs. Their ide-
ologies assume regulatory costs are highly burdensome, so the re-
searchers select a methodology that allows them to reach that conclu-
sion. The contortions become more strained when the authors want 
to prove that the costs of regulations put into place by one admin-
istration are far greater than the costs of another. 
One would expect that both sides of the political spectrum would 
be interested in overall regulatory costs, but that does not turn out to 
be the case. I was unable to find any serious modern left-leaning es-
timates of total regulatory burdens.22 This has largely ceded the field 
to conservative organizations, which bring far more passion to the 
 
 22.  I suspect this may be due to certain subjects being of greater ideological interest to 
those institutions. One can find examples of minimizing the cost of specific government pro-
grams, however. See, e.g., the Political Economy Research Institute, “Economic Analysis of 
Medicare for All” (Nov. 30, 2018) https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1127-
economic-analysis-of-medicare-for-all (assessing the cost of Sen. Bernie Sanders’s Medicare 
For All plan as $13.5 trillion over ten years, roughly $20 trillion less than estimates by relatively 
neutral entities like Rand). 
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enterprise. This one-sided energy in the field has produced a host of 
inaccurate estimates with questionable methodologies. 
1.  $2 Trillion in annual regulatory costs—only through bad 
modeling 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Peter Navarro and Wil-
bur Ross—now a White House advisor on trade and secretary of 
commerce, respectively—authored a justification of then-candidate 
Trump’s economic plans.23 The report claimed Trump would “re-
duce the current regulatory burden by a minimum of 10% or $200 
billion annually.”24 The authors were working off the assumption that 
the annual regulatory burden is about $2 trillion, a figure for which 
they cited an influential study by the National Association of Manu-
facturers (NAM) from 2014.25 What, in turn, was NAM’s methodol-
ogy? 
To understand the methodology, one must break down specific 
contributors to the overall burden. The NAM study’s conclusions, if 
true, paint a dire picture of federal regulation. The NAM study posits 
an annual regulatory burden of $2.028 trillion, or roughly 11% of 
U.S. GDP.26 That staggering share of the economy roughly corre-
sponds to the annual contribution of the entire U.S. manufacturing 
sector.27 Of that $2.028 trillion, the NAM study found that “econom-
ic” regulations—those that “govern decision-making in market trans-
actions” according to the authors28— imposed by far the highest cost, 
$1.448 trillion. Environmental regulation imposed $330 billion, tax 
compliance $159 billion, and occupational safety, health, and home-
land security regulations $92 billion.29 
The short version of NAM’s methodology for calculating the im-
pact of economic regulations which make up 71% of the alleged reg-
ulatory burden, is this: (1) use a survey of business leaders to establish 
 
 23.  Navarro, supra note 3.  
 24.  Id. at 6. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Crain & Crain, supra note 12; Interactive Access, supra note 10.  
 27.  U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY: 
THIRD QUARTER 2018, at 9 (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/ 
gdpind318.pdf. 
 28.  Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 28. 
 29.  Id. at 50. 
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the quality of U.S. regulation relative to other nations’ regulations; 
(2) compare the regulatory score to the GDP of each country to get a 
numerical estimate of how much regulation quality determines 
GDP;30 (3) calculate how much larger or smaller the United States 
GDP would have been had it received the same score as the top per-
forming countries on regulation quality; and (4) subtract actual U.S. 
GDP from U.S. GDP under an optimal regulatory scenario and the 
result is the regulatory burden (i.e., the difference between how the 
U.S. economy would perform if U.S. regulation matched in quality 
the regulation of the highest-ranked countries).31 
There are three independently crippling problems with the 
study’s implementation of this approach, which I will detail further 
below.32 
• Conflation of regulatory efficiency and regulatory bur-
den: The authors measured regulatory performance of 
the United States relative to other countries and used it to 
extract an absolute figure for U.S. regulatory burden; 
• Use of evidence not focused on regulatory burden: The 
authors used survey data of non-experts to estimate a nu-
anced and complicated phenomenon; and 
• Calculation of the effect on absolute GDP: The authors 
used absolute GDP instead of GDP growth, which yields 
an over-sensitive model where many minor phenomena 
appear far more important than they plausibly could be. 
 a.  Conflating regulatory efficiency and regulatory burden.   To 
explain the flaws in the methodology used by NAM and relied upon by 
the Trump administration, I will start at the broadest conceptual level 
before descending into the more technical. At the highest level, this 
study is not measuring regulatory burden. It is attempting to measure 
how much wealthier the United States would be if its regulatory 
structure was similar to that of the “best” regulatory countries in the 
world. That is, inherently, a question of relative cost, not absolute cost 
 
 30.  Statistically savvy readers will recognize this as a regression analysis. I am trying to 
keep the terminology simple for lay readers. 
 31.  See Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Roll-
back Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845 (2018) (an article-length and extremely 
thorough accounting of the NAM study, which helped this author much better understand 
NAM’s methodology). 
 32.  For a more detailed technical discussion, see id. at 862-75.  
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of regulation. The regulatory quality score that NAM relies upon is 
measuring businesses perception of how efficient a country seems at 
regulation, not how much it regulates. 
Perhaps the easiest way to see this flaw is to note the countries 
that scored highest in one of the three categories NAM used to calcu-
late regulation quality: Singapore, Qatar, Rwanda, Finland, and 
Hong Kong.33 The NAM methodology contends that the United 
States economic regulatory burden would be zero if only it regulated 
like Finland, a country that regulates far more than the United States. 
And, lest we think Finland actually has a regulatory burden of zero, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that relatively inef-
ficient product market regulation imposes a 10% drag on Finnish 
productivity.34 Singapore and Qatar are also known for regulatory ef-
ficiency, not necessarily light regulation of their economies. It is 
simply nonsensical to assume the United States could entirely wipe 
out its regulatory burden by successfully matching those countries in 
regulatory quality. 
On first examination, it is surprising that a business-friendly or-
ganization like the National Association of Manufacturers would 
make this error because this methodology superficially seems like it 
could underestimate the regulatory burden. One can imagine the 
regulatory burden as a combination of the cost of the substance of 
regulations (e.g., a business must cut emissions of regulated pollu-
tants) and the cost of inefficient regulatory process (e.g., multiple 
agencies administer a particular rule, so businesses have to fill out 
more paperwork). The NAM methodology examines only the latter 
category of costs, so it seems to be ceteris paribus underestimating 
the overall burden. 
It turns out that ceteris is not paribus in this case. NAM’s meth-
odology does not count substantive burden, but it dramatically over-
estimates the process burden, allowing the authors to draw the con-
clusion that the overall burden is vastly larger than it actually is. 
From a political perspective, costs due to substance garner far more 
 
 33.  The survey question was “In your country, how burdensome is it for businesses to 
comply with governmental administrative requirements (e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)?” 
Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014: Full Data Edition, WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM, at 418 (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompeti 
tivenessReport_2013-14.pdf. 
 34.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINLAND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 16/369, at 28 
(NOVEMBER 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16369.pdf. 
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attention than costs due to process. Indeed, to speak of “deregula-
tion” as process improvements that do not allow any greater freedom 
to businesses or individuals sounds strange, if not outright erroneous. 
If process improvements can spur bigger gains than substantive de-
regulation, political opponents of regulation have every incentive to 
conflate process improvements with the overall regulatory burden. In 
that way, substantive regulatory changes can be presented as the logi-
cal solution to the regulatory burden. The NAM study’s methodo-
logical emphasis on process improvements rather than substantive 
changes in regulation benefits opponents of regulation as long as the 
problem is ultimately described as “regulatory burden” instead of 
“process deficiencies.” 
 b.  Using evidence not focused on regulatory burden. In the NAM 
study, the relative regulatory burden of various countries is based on 
a survey given to business executives in 148 countries.35 The NAM 
report uses three different survey questions to create a unified 
measure of relative regulatory burden. The questions were: 
• In your country, how burdensome is it for businesses to 
comply with governmental administrative requirements 
(e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)? 
• In your country, how easy is it for private businesses to 
challenge government actions and/or regulations through 
the legal system? 
• In your country, how effective are the regulation and su-
pervision of securities exchanges?36 
 
The three questions are weighted equally, but only the first has 
anything to do with regulatory burdens per se. The second relates to 
ease of challenge through the legal system, not the burden of com-
plying nor the cost to the government of enforcement. The third 
question is highly ambiguous as to what “effective” means. The po-
lice of a totalitarian state are “effective,” but one would not say they 
impose a negligible burden on society. 
The first question is also ambiguous as to the kind of regulatory 
burden—substantive or process. A business leader answering the 
 
 35.  Schwab, supra note 33. 
 36.  Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at appendix c, 68; Schwab, supra note 33. 
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question might find the regulatory burden extremely high (e.g., she 
runs a coal mine threatened by climate change-related regulations) 
but interpret the question as asking about process because of the ref-
erence to “administrative requirements.” In the same vein, the second 
question is inquiring about a particular part of the regulatory process 
that might be entirely independent from the rest. It is entirely possi-
ble that a country has few strict regulations, administers them in a 
very efficient way, but does not easily allow for judicial review. In 
such a case, the NAM methodology would erroneously peg that 
country as having a high regulatory burden. Finally, the third survey 
question is obviously focused on a specific part of the economy en-
tirely distinct from the rest. This approach might be more defensible 
if the authors evaluated any other distinct segment of the economy, 
but they do not. 
The use of the survey in the NAM study is further flawed because 
the perception of business leaders in a given country is, necessarily, 
subjective and grounded in previous history. If the culture is accus-
tomed to a large, intrusive government (e.g., Finland, Singapore), 
then the perception of the same substantive regulatory burden will be 
very different than in a country with a tradition of a smaller federal 
government (e.g., the United States). In that same vein, recent events 
will also skew answers. Even with the relatively low substantive regu-
latory burden of the United States, if the survey were conducted in 
the aftermath of a major new regulation, the responses will be ab-
normally high. 
 c.  Calculating effect on absolute GDP creates an overly sensitive 
model. The final, perhaps most damning flaw of the NAM report is 
the use of GDP instead of GDP growth when calculating the effect 
of regulation. In the NAM study, the authors’ model is being forced 
to explain the difference between OECD countries’ per capita GDP 
using a proxy for regulatory burden (determined from survey data) 
and a few other control variables unlikely to dramatically affect the 
outcome.37 Naturally, then, the regulatory burden proxy has to 
 
 37.  Those variables are foreign trade as a percentage of GDP, the dependency ratio (i.e., 
the ratio of workers to retirees), the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, the ratio of capital investment 
to GDP, and size of the labor force. The NAM study authors note that those control variables 
are drawn from “empirical literature that examines differences in economic levels across coun-
tries over time.” Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 32. 
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explain a disproportionately high share of GDP. Through that 
methodology, the “burden” of regulations that are less appealing to 
business executives in the United States causes a drain of $1.4 trillion 
annually on GDP. By contrast, if the authors had correctly used 
GDP growth instead of per capita GDP—the standard practice in 
econometric studies of this nature38— they would have found that 
their measure of regulatory burden is positively correlated with 
growth. That is, of course, a nonsensical outcome, suggesting that 
something is wrong with the NAM model for regulatory burden. 
In order to estimate the effect of regulation, the authors needed 
to construct a model of factors that contribute to GDP in order to 
isolate the effect of regulation. In reality, the single most powerful 
factor in predicting any year’s GDP is almost laughably simple: the 
previous year’s GDP. Consider it this way: India had a GDP of about 
$2.6 trillion in 2017, while the United States had a GDP of $19.4 
trillion. Now suppose you had to predict which country, as of 2019, 
has a GDP of $21.5 trillion. The United States is the obvious guess 
because it only needed to grow a small amount to get there. 
To draw a parallel to the NAM methodology, now assume that 
your model cannot reference the previous year’s GDP. To figure out 
which country now has a GDP of $21.5 trillion, you would essentially 
have to force the model to overweigh whatever other factors are be-
ing considered, such as the educational level of the country, or its 
weather. Whatever factor in which the United States is doing better 
than India suddenly looks far more important than it actually is.39 
Using that same model and replacing regulatory burden with 
other survey data from the OECD business executive survey produc-
es absurd results, showing how silly the model is in the first place. A 
deficit of public trust in politicians carries an annual cost to the Unit-
ed States of $1.863 trillion. Organized crime imposes $1.993 trillion. 
 
 38.  Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback 
Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845, 866 (2018). 
 39.  One could inquire why the previous year’s GDP is so determinative. A helpful way 
to think about it is that the previous year’s GDP is the result of the entire history of the country 
to that year. Taking India and the United States as our examples. Everything from radically 
different experiences of colonialism to different climates to different geopolitical challenges 
factored into the previous year’s GDP. A model that neglects to account for the previous year’s 
GDP must instead recreate all those complicated factors explicitly in the model if it is to be 
equally accurate. Such a model is for all practical purposes impossible to create.  
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A lack of perfect judicial independence imposes a whopping $1.352 
trillion, about as much as NAM’s economic regulatory burden.40 
If GDP growth is used instead of per capita GDP, it turns out the 
effect of the regulatory burden as defined in the NAM study is not 
statistically significant and negative in sign—that is, regulatory bur-
den seems to increase GDP growth. While the idea that regulatory 
burden increases growth is obviously incorrect, the statistical quirk 
indicates the underlying obtuseness of the NAM survey. The only 
way to find a massive regulatory burden in the data used by NAM is 
to use the wrong variable. Using the right variable simply reveals that 
the model does not work. 
 d.  Problems with the non-economic parts of the study. While the 
other components in the $2.028 trillion estimate of overall regulatory 
burden are far smaller than the $1.4 trillion from economic 
regulation, they also have methodological flaws. To quote one review 
of the NAM study’s environmental methodology: “[T]he number in 
question is taken from a 1991 study of pre-1988 vintage 
environmental regulations, which drew its number from an earlier 
general equilibrium exercise that has since been thoroughly examined 
and de-bunked by outside scholars.”41 
Other categories of regulation comprising the $2.028 trillion es-
timate that do not fit comfortably with the concept of regulatory 
burden include tax and security compliance. The NAM study in-
cludes $159 billion for tax compliance42 and $21 billion for homeland 
security compliance.43 While the tax system is a burden placed on in-
dividuals and businesses by government, it does not directly restrict 
private sector activities. Homeland security regulations may inci-
dentally restrict private sector activities—e.g., forbidding citizens 
from building nuclear power plants in their backyard—but including 
them as part of the regulatory burden potentially expands the concept 
of regulatory burden beyond recognition. If homeland security regu-
lations are included, why not include costs imposed by the Depart-
ment of Defense? Those costs include the exclusive use of some parts 
 
 40.  Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback 
Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845, 869 (2018). 
 41.  Id. at 854. 
 42.  Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 39. 
 43.  Id. at 37. 
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of the electromagnetic spectrum, the use of land for bases, the diver-
sion of personnel from peacetime pursuits because of their employ-
ment in the military, etc. I have not seen any studies include those 
costs in overall regulatory burden, presumably because security is 
generally considered a core function of the state rather than regula-
tion. 
To summarize, this highly cited estimate of regulatory burden 
falls short because of methodological choices that seem tailor-made 
to support a high estimate. This is perfectly understandable—NAM 
is an advocacy organization, and it makes sense for it to overstate the 
cost of regulations with obtuse but non-fraudulent methodologies. 
However, a neutral observer should not use the NAM estimate as a 
starting point for understanding the effect of Trump’s deregulatory 
actions, even if the administration itself cites the $2 trillion figure. 
2.  $1.9 trillion in regulatory costs—by simply not trying to produce a 
credible estimate 
The difficulty of estimating regulatory costs has led to stunning 
examples of misplaced trust in think tank estimates. For example, the 
Trump administration cited a May 2017 study by the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute (CEI), Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of 
All Cost of Regulation Estimates And the Need to Compile Them 
Anyway,44 that pegged annual regulatory costs at about $1.9 trillion.45 
Many other Republican elected officials have cited CEI’s estimate, 
including presidential candidates, senators, and representatives.46 The 
 
 44.  Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of All Cost of Regu-
lation Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway (Jan. 8, 2017) (Working Paper) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2502883. 
 45.  Navarro, supra note 3, at 6. 
 46.  Examples include former Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, Michael C. Bender and 
Bloomberg News, Jeb Bush Says Regulation Changes Can Lift Wages, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 22, 
2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-news-bc-bush-wages22-20150922-
story.html; Senator James Lankford, Press Release, Office of Senator Lankford, Federal Fum-
bles 100 Ways the Government Dropped the Ball (2015), https://www.lankford.senate.gov 
/imo/media/doc/Federal_Fumbles_2015.pdf; Senator Mike Rounds, Press Release, Office of 
Senator Rounds, Rounds Introduced RESTORE To Permanently Address Regulatory Reform, 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.rounds.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rounds-introduces-
restore-to-permanently-address-regulatory-reform; Senator Ron Johnson, Press Release, Office 
of Senator Ron Johnson, How Will You Pay Your Family’s $15,000 in Regulatory Costs? (Apr. 
18, 2014), https://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/in-the-news?ID=bca085fa-
18b5-4bf0-9283-2180950524b6; Senator Shelley Moore Capito, Lori Robertson, GOP Con-
vention Day 2, FACTCHECK (July 20, 2016) https://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/gop-
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$1.9 trillion formulation was so popular that it started being misin-
terpreted as the burden solely attributable to Obama administration 
regulations.47 
For a report cited so widely, it surprisingly lacks even a veneer of 
credibility. The report cites studies that use methodology similar to 
that of the more serious but methodologically hopeless NAM study 
discussed at length above and extrapolates from OMB reports pub-
lished around the turn of the century.48 Using this hodgepodge of 
questionable or outdated sources, the report concludes that the regu-
latory burden is very large. The salient, damning technical features of 
this report are identical to those of the NAM study: using GDP in-
stead of GDP growth; using survey data; and using relative regulatory 
efficiency as a proxy for absolute regulatory burden. 
What is distinctive about the CEI report is that it is explicitly 
presented as flippant and partisan. The title should be a warning that 
the estimate is not particularly meaningful, and the report itself glee-
fully agrees. The paper, to its credit, several times states that its num-
bers are not in any sense real. Its language is forthright and non-
academic: “I’m more apt to call the figures I assemble ‘placeholders’ 
for a subset of costs than concretely known costs, and in most in-
stances the reader can interpret them that way. After all, we ‘measure’ 
GDP, and that’s not measurable either . . . .”49 Perhaps even more 
bluntly: “A wave of assumptions and guesses without scholarly pre-
tension underlie this tally, but the intent is serious.”50 Later, when 
explaining an estimate of the cost of “economic regulation,” the au-
thor explains: “By summing these estimates and then folding them in 
N-dimensional hyperspace, blowing on them twice and taking the 
 
convention-day-2/; Senator Mike Lee,  Sen. Mike Lee and Rep Mark Walker, Make govern-
ment accountable again, WASH. EXAMINER, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/make-
government-accountable-again); and Representatives Bob Goodlatte and Lynn Jenkins. Glenn 
Kessler, The claim that American households have a $15,000 regulatory ‘burden,’ WASH. POST 
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/01/14/the-
claim-that-american-households-have-a-15000-regulatory-burden/.  
 47.  David Sherfinski, Obama’s regulations in 2016 to drain economy by $2 trillion, 
WASH. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/31/obamas-
regulations-in-2016-to-drain-economy-by-2-t/. 
 48.  Crews, supra note 44, at 12. 
 49.  Id. at 9. 
 50.  Id. at 10. 
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non-derivative, we arrive at an estimate of economic regulatory costs 
of [$402.05 billion annually].”51 
This report, which is more a provocative bit of art meant to high-
light the lack of serious estimates of regulatory costs than a meaning-
ful source of information, pervades discussions of overall regulatory 
burden. In addition to the Trump administration and the senators 
and representatives discussed earlier, many media outlets have pre-
sented the CEI study as credible. To be sure, most are conservative-
leaning, but some are assuredly mainstream, including USA Today;52 
Wall Street Journal;53 The Hill;54 Forbes;55 and the Daily Caller.56 
And, of course, many think tanks and right-leaning groups have 
repeated the CEI study’s claims, including: the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce;57 Freedomworks;58 the Federalist Society (through an af-
filiated enterprise called the “Regulatory Transparency Project”);59 
the Heartland Institute;60 the Mises Organization;61 and the Club for 
Growth.62 
 
 51.  Id. at 37. 
 52.  Luke Hilgemann, More Regulations Equals Less Business, USA TODAY, (Feb. 28, 
2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/02/28/economy-health-businesses-entre-
preneurship-column/22590839/. 
 53.  Washington’s Hidden Tax: $1.9 Trillion, WALL STREET J., (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/washingtons-hidden-tax-1-9-trillion-1431385233. 
 54.  J.T. Young, Time for a Regulatory Budget, THE HILL, (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/417019-time-for-a-regulatory-budget. 
 55.  Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Obama’s 2016 Federal Budget and Middle Class Econom-
ics, FORBES, (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2015/02/02/obamas-fy-
2016-federal-budget-and-middle-class-economics/#3d7c6eaf67e3. 
 56.  Ethan Barton, Economy Hit with Hidden $1.9 Trillion Tax from Federal Regula-
tions, DAILY CALLER, (May 4, 2016), https://dailycaller.com/2016/05/04/economy-hit-with-
hidden-1-9-trillion-tax-from-federal-regulations/. 
 57. The Regulatory Impact on Small Business: Complex. Cumbersome. Costly, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COM. FOUND., (Mar. 2017), https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/smallbiz 
regs/assets/files/Small_Business_Regulation_Study.pdf. 
 58.  Patrick Hedger, Regulatory Review April 21-May 4, 2018, FREEDOMWORKS, (May 
4, 2018), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/regulatory-review-april-21-may-4-2018. 
 59.  Time for a Regulatory Budget, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://regproject.org/time-regulatory-budget/. 
 60.  Kenneth Artz, Federal Regulations Cost Americans $1.9 Trillion in 2017, THE 
HEARTLAND INST., (Jul. 19, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/federal-
regulations-cost-americans-19-trillion-in-2017. 
 61.  Tho Bishop, CEI: Federal Regulations Cost $1.9 Trillion Annually, MISES INST., 
(May 10, 2018), https://mises.org/power-market/cei-federal-regulations-cost-19-trillion-
annually. 
 62.  John Merline, Federal Regulations Now Cost Almost $1.9 Trillion, Study Finds, 
CLUB FOR GROWTH, (May 4, 2016), https://www.clubforgrowth.org/31016-2/. 
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Ironically, one of the few things the CEI study gets correct is the 
dearth of serious studies of overall regulatory costs. In the absence of 
such studies, the field is occupied by the CEI study, the NAM study 
discussed previously, a few other similar partisan exercises, and the 
official estimate issued by OMB. 
3.  OMB: $78 to $115 billion, but with a non-comprehensive 
approach 
The Office of Management and Budget annually issues its own 
estimate of total regulatory costs by summing the cost estimates of 
major rules, agency by agency, for rules finalized over the past ten 
years. The 2017 edition, the first issued under the Trump admin-
istration, pegged the range of regulatory costs at $78 to $115 bil-
lion.63 Its methodology is far more conservative than that of the 
right-leaning think tanks. OMB simply identifies rules for which 
agencies have identified the costs, then adds the costs together.64 
This approach is inherently less risky than developing a model to 
estimate total regulatory burden, but it has clear shortcomings. Not 
every rule has a cost estimate, and not every rule is included in 
OMB’s analysis. For example, OMB includes in its review only “ma-
jor” rules that have an estimated cost of at least $100 million over at 
least one year.65 In its 2017 review of regulations issued from fiscal 
year 2007 through fiscal year 2016, OMB reviewed 2,670 final rules, 
of which 609 were “major” rules. During that period, federal agencies 
issued 36,255 final rules.66 
Clearly, the aggregation of all those smaller rules without formal 
cost estimates might have a substantial effect. It is not certain that 
they do, however, because many of the rules in question have essen-
tially zero impact on private sector compliance costs. OMB under 
both Republican and Democrat administrations has asserted that ma-
jor rules constitute a majority of regulatory costs.67 Taking that asser-
 
 63.  2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. 
 64.  OMB formerly used a model-based approach, producing estimates far higher than 
their current ones. Those estimates are cited by studies like Costberg as cover for high esti-
mates. Given that the organizations that put them out 18 years ago do not use the same meth-
odology now, those studies should not be given similar credence.  
 65.  2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. 
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tion at face value means that the costs could not be more than dou-
bled by these non-major rules. Even doubled, the $78 to $115 billion 
OMB estimate of overall regulatory costs would be a small fraction of 
the costs estimated by the model-based studies described above. 
The reliability of agency cost-benefit analysis has been studied 
and does not dramatically alter the conclusions above. Agencies tend 
to systematically overestimate both costs and benefits.68 On the costs 
side, agencies often underestimate the ability of the private sector to 
cope with a restriction. If a particular technology is outlawed, another 
arises to take its place, or a wholly unrelated process arises to achieve 
the same end. To be fair, agencies probably should not lower cost es-
timates to reflect uncertain technological solutions. However, at the 
very least, this tendency should counteract the urge to raise OMB’s 
cost estimates to reflect non-major rules.69 
4.  Overall regulatory burden as a symptom of broader empirical 
problems 
The studies analyzed above suggest a profound truth about em-
pirical estimates of regulatory burdens: they have often been either 
comprehensive or credible, but not both. To the extent there was a 
nationwide debate about the regulatory burden before the Trump 
administration, it was based on an unrealistic image of how economi-
cally significant the costs of regulation are. If one trusted the most 
recent federal estimates, there was little economic impact from over-
regulation per se, even if regulation could be more efficient. If one 
looked to think tank and industry estimates, regulation was strangling 
off perhaps as much as 20% of GDP annually. Those studies of total 
regulatory burden set the stage for estimates of Trump-specific sav-
ings from deregulation. 
 
 68.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, at 11 (Jan. 21, 2016). 
 69.  While this paper does not focus on regulatory benefits, the explanation for how 
agencies overestimate benefits is probably similar in some respects. If a rule is meant to stop a 
particular activity, but industry can carry out a similar activity with a new technology or pro-
cess, it is entirely conceivable that the intended benefits will be dampened. A very common 
conservative criticism is that agencies deliberately overestimate benefits in order to justify regu-
latory action. The tendency of costs to be overestimated as well suggests that other factors carry 
more explanatory weight. 
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C.  Existing Estimates of Trump’s Regulatory Cost Savings 
Understanding the difficulties of estimating regulatory burden 
helps explain the existing estimates of Trump’s regulatory cost reduc-
tions. These estimates generally match the pattern that preceded 
Trump: federal estimates based on aggregation of specific rules might 
not tell the whole story, and partisan extrapolations based on poor 
modeling or skewed data are simply not credible. The significant dif-
ference from overall regulatory burden estimates is that partisan pas-
sions engendered by the Trump era have made methodological errors 
even more egregious. 
OMB’s estimate paints a frankly unimpressive picture. OMB’s of-
ficial estimate of deregulatory savings from the beginning of the 
Trump presidency through the end of fiscal year 2018 was $23.57 
billion. However, taking a closer look at the specific deregulatory ac-
tions included in that figure, it’s clear that the overwhelming majority 
of identified rules and savings come from actions deemed “deregula-
tory,” but which are really just tweaks in payment formulas. As I dis-
cuss below, using a generous definition of what constitutes a true 
“deregulatory” action, as of the end of fiscal year 2018, there had 
been only three major deregulatory actions by the Trump admin-
istration accounting for a total of about $100 million in annual cost 
reduction. 
Think tank and media estimates of deregulatory savings paint a 
different picture, but largely by measuring something other than the 
real or predicted economic effects of finalized actions. Instead, they 
project forward based on unrealistic assumptions about hypothetical 
actions. For example, if the Trump administration delays implemen-
tation of a regulation that will have a $1 billion cost, this delay is por-
trayed as “potentially” saving up to $1 billion. In every case, the regu-
lation will either go forward as planned at a later date, or at best will 
be replaced by another rule that might cost, say, $950 million instead 
of $1 billion. Breathless assertions of “potential” savings appear in-
tended to produce positive headlines rather than actual assessments 
of regulatory savings. 
Ultimately, there is little choice for now but to accept the federal 
estimates because the think tank/industry estimates have major, iden-
tifiable flaws. But the failure of the think tank/industry studies, de-
tailed further below, helps point the direction toward the synthesis of 
approaches that will constitute Part II of this article. 
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1.  Gossamer think tank estimates: $60 billion or $86 billion in 
“potential” savings 
Think tank estimates of regulatory savings generally take one of 
two approaches. The first is to present regulatory cost estimates in a 
carefully worded, accurate, but misleading way, which allows less rig-
orous media outlets to further muddy the waters with simpler but in-
correct headlines. This approach allows the think tanks to be techni-
cally correct, but they must operate in such a confusing manner that 
their results are like fine glass: beautiful, but easily destroyed by the 
slightest mistake in handling. 
An example: the Washington Free Beacon declared on April 20, 
2017—exactly three months into the Trump administration—
“Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in Regulatory Savings.”70 The 
article linked to a study by the American Action Forum (AAF), which 
describes itself as “lead[ing] the center-right on economic and fiscal 
policy issues.”71 Other media outlets cited the same report and 
claimed $86 billion in savings. The Washington Examiner ran the 
headline: “Trump reg cuts save immediate $3.7 billion, $86 billion 
overall.”72 An opinion piece in The Hill was more breathless still: 
“Study: Trump has eliminated $86B in regs.”73 
 
 70.  Elizabeth Harrington, Report: Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in Regulatory 
Savings, WASH. FREE BEACON (Apr. 20, 2017), https://freebeacon.com/issues/report-trump-
rolls-back-60-billion-regulatory-savings/. 
 71.  Sam Batkins, Tracking Regulatory Modernization in the Trump Administration, 
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM, (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ 
tracking-regulatory-modernization-trump-administration. 
 72.  Paul Bedard, Trump Reg Cuts Save Immediate $3.7Billion, $86 Billion Overall, 
WASH. EXAMINER (May 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-reg-cuts-save-
immediate-37-billion-86-billion-overall. 
 73.  Tim Devaney, Study: Trump Has Eliminated $86B in Regs, THE HILL (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://thehill.com/regulation/329720-study-trump-has-eliminated-86b-in-regs.  
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The bizarre difference in something as simple as the bottom line 
arises from AAF’s very careful wording. The $60 billion figure came 
in the conclusion of the study, which stated (emphasis added): 
 
Regulatory reform has taken many shapes during the Trump ad-
ministration: CRA votes, increased flexibility in compliance, and 
formal reviews of major rules. As AAF has documented, this has the 
ability to generate more than $60 billion in cost savings . . . .74 
 
To their credit, the authors included in the actual report a specif-
ic estimate of estimated future savings: “$4.1 billion in total net pre-
sent value costs” between CRA resolutions and executive actions.75 
The $60 billion figure links to another AAF report, which tracks “ex-
ecutive actions seeking regulatory rescissions and formal delays.”76 A 
table then describes the total cost of each rule being delayed. The in-
formation is presented as “Totals: $55.1 billion in affected costs.”77 
Note that this is the total cost of delayed rules, not the total savings 
from repealed rules. A delayed rule will simply impose the same costs 
at a later date. 
To summarize that circuitous journey: the administration delayed 
some rules, AAF displayed a table showing “totals” of “affected costs” 
related to those rules, and a media source interpreted that as actual 
cost savings. In reality, the $55.1 billion figure is meaningless. It is 
the total, final cost of rules that continued in some form with a mere 
delay in implementation. The actual completed deregulatory actions 
selected by AAF accounted for $4.1 billion in present value, and “rule 
delays” added another $12.2 billion in “affected costs.”78 That vague 
accounting yielded the conclusion that deregulation “has the ability 
to generate more than $60 billion in cost savings . . . .”79 
 
 74.  Sam Batkins, Fiscal Benefits of the CRA, Regulatory Reform, AMERICAN ACTION 
FORUM (April 20, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/fiscal-benefits-cra-
regulatory-reform/ (emphasis added).  
 75.  Batkins, supra note 71. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 78.  The AAF accounting also includes rules that are only deregulatory in a technical 
sense. 
 79.  Batkins, supra note 74.  
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The $86 billion figure’s provenance is simpler, but even more er-
roneous. The AAF study notes that one of the rules undone by a 
Congressional Review Act vote was the Department of Education’s 
”Accountability and State Plans” measure.80 The report notes that the 
regulatory measure contained conditions for accessing federal appro-
priations for state and local educational agencies.81 Those funds to-
taled $86.9 billion.82 AAF explicitly notes: “This denunciation of the 
regulation, however, does not speak to the form of a substitute rule 
or if the $86 billion in spending will return (which it likely will).”83 
The $86 billion is thus not cost savings by any fair discernment of 
regulatory costs, a fact which did not stop multiple media outlets—
and a book by Laura Ingraham and the Trump reelection cam-
paign—from claiming it.84 
While organizations like AAF, to their credit, usually stay on the 
right side of the line between truth and falsehoods in their confusing 
but transparent analyses, their reports tend more toward puffery than 
actual analysis. Tabulating the value of every rule that might be 
changed in some way and then presenting that as “potential” savings 
is, at best, unhelpful in determining the actual effect of deregulatory 
actions. At worst, it is knowingly misleading less meticulous entities 
like the Washington Free Beacon into generating bombastic propa-
ganda. 
2.  Hybrid think tank/industry estimates: sloppy language, unrealistic 
assumptions, big mistakes 
In some cases, think tanks entirely or partially rely on industry es-
timates, which can lead to skewed accounting. While industry esti-
mates can be credible, they understandably carry the stigma of self-
interest and sometimes do not stand up to scrutiny. This was particu-
larly evident in the context of the seventeen deregulatory Congres-
sional Review Act (CRA) resolutions signed into law by President 
Trump. While Trump’s deregulatory agenda is generally confined to 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  LAURA INGRAHAM, BILLIONAIRE AT THE BARRICADES: THE POPULIST 
REVOLUTION FROM REAGAN TO TRUMP 249 (2018); First 100 Days: The Truth Mainstream 
Media Refuses to Tell, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/100. 
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the executive branch, the CRA resolutions largely terminated rules 
adopted toward the end of the Obama administration.85 When four-
teen of the seventeen rules had been terminated, AAF issued an anal-
ysis of the economic effect of the CRA resolutions up to that point.86 
It dutifully surveyed the regulatory impact analyses for the rules in 
question, which in their estimation added up to $3.7 billion in total 
regulatory costs.87 AAF also included industry cost estimates, which it 
pegged at a shockingly high $34.8 billion.88 
Three aspects of AAF’s analysis are worth delving into. First, ob-
viously, the vast difference between the federal agencies’ estimates 
and industry’s demands explanation. Second, on closer inspection, 
the summation of the federal agency estimates appears to be flat-out 
incorrect. Third, the numbers are, whether innocently or not, pre-
sented in a misleading manner that prompted outsiders to add to-
gether the two estimates. 
The summation of federal estimates should have been the easiest 
part of this exercise: simply take the agency cost estimates from the 
regulatory impact analyses of each rule and add them up. Obviously, 
one would need to take the costs over the same period in order to 
give some sense of comparison. AAF either used an undisclosed 
methodology or made a mistake in finding the federal cost estimates. 
For example, the stream buffer rule’s official annual compliance cost 
estimate is $81 million for industry and $720,000 for regulators from 
2020 to 2040.89 AAF claimed that the federal estimate for total cost 
was “$1.2 billion” over an unspecified period.90 It is not simply the 
 
 85.  Two of the 17 CRA resolutions struck down rules promulgated by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which due to its independence was able to continue 
adopting substantive new rules for some time during the Trump administration. One of the 
CRA resolutions blocked a CFPB rule adopted during the Trump administration. See 
S.J.Res.57, “A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 
5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection re-
lating to ‘Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’”, 
115th Cong. (2018) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/57 
 86.  Sam Batkins, The Congressional Review Act in 2017, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM 
(May 10, 2017) https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/15550/. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93066 (2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 
700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 782, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/12/20/2016-29958/stream-protection-
rule#p-3034. 
 90.  Batkins, supra note 86.  
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annual cost estimate multiplied by 20 years ($1.6 billion), and it is not 
the present discounted value of $81 million over 20 years ($868 mil-
lion). AAF may have derived the $1.2 billion from the federal esti-
mate, but if so, it is not clear how. 
Why harp so much on $1.2 billion? As far as I can find, only one 
federal entity of any kind endorsed the $1.2 billion figure—the com-
munications team at the White House, which used the number in a 
press release.91 However, if we are estimating the effect of Trump’s 
deregulatory actions, then repeal of the stream buffer rule did not 
save the economy $1.2 billion in 2017. Taken at face value, repeal 
would have saved $81 million annually had the rule been in effect. 
The failure to get the federal estimate right pales in comparison 
to the unreliability of the industry estimate for the cost of the stream 
buffer rule—$29 billion, or 83% of AAF’s total supposed savings 
from the CRA deregulatory actions. That estimate utterly dwarfs the 
federal estimate of $81 million per year, and singlehandedly explains 
almost all of the difference between the federal and industry cost es-
timates. 
Such a vast difference suggests a major methodological problem, 
and, indeed, the industry estimate which was later used by AAF has 
one: sampling. The report’s author simply asked respondents to esti-
mate changes in production and costs because of the stream buffer 
rule. There were thirty-six mine owners included in the survey “from 
firms representing over 66% of the national coal production in the 
U.S.”92 The report does not specify the mines, so we have no way of 
knowing if their costs are representative. We also cannot know the 
validity of the responses, since mine owners would have an incentive 
to offer an inflated estimate. 
There is good reason to suspect that a nonrepresentative sample 
was used: the report was prepared in 2015 for the National Mining 
Association, an industry group with an interest in maximizing the ap-
 
 91.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING’S STREAM 
PROTECTION RULE: AN OVERVIEW (Jan. 2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com/ 
files/20170111_R44150_aeb8ad15c32441ec3bdb6788400bda94f4aa8d86.pdf (no mention of a 
$1.2 billion cost estimate); see also WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 
UNLEASHES AMERICA’S ENERGY POTENTIAL (Jun. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-unleashes-americas-energy-potential/.  
 92.  RAMBOLL ENVIRON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED STREAM PROTECTION 
RULE 12 (2015), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/10/26/document_gw_01.pdf.  
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parent cost of the regulation.93 Methodological problems notwith-
standing, the $29 billion figure has been cited by dozens of Republi-
can politicians and right-leaning think-tanks, practically never with 
any documentation.94 
On the basis of its survey, the authors of the National Mining As-
sociation report calculated that there would be a decrease in coal 
production of between 263.1 and 629.7 million short tons because of 
the stream protection rule over the life of the rule.95 When the report 
was written, that constituted about 35%–72% of annual U.S. coal 
production.96 For comparison, the Obama-era Department of the In-
terior predicted the rule would decrease coal production by a total of 
0.08% from 2020 to 2040.97 
Finally, AAF presented the two estimates ($3.7 billion and $34.8 
billion) as agency cost and industry cost, which a casual reader might 
take to mean the regulation’s cost to the federal government and the 
cost to the industries affected.98 Indeed, media outlets like the Wash-
ington Times did interpret the language in that way.99 As we have 
 
 93.  See id. The report also became the subject of debate because it projected up to 
77,000 lost jobs, a figure later cited by Senator Rand Paul and President Trump. Glenn Kessler, 
Did President Trump Save 77,000 Coal Mining Jobs?, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/02/27/did-president-trump-
save-77000-coal-mining-jobs/?utm_term=.1ad368cd1d2a.  
 94.  See, e.g., The Development and Potential Implementation of the Office of Surface 
Mining, Reclamation, and Enforcement’s Proposed Stream Protection Rule: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. U.S. S., 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Sen. Lisa 
Murkowski, Chairman, S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ 
pkg/CHRG-114shrg98945/pdf/CHRG-114shrg98945.pdf. 
 95.  RAMBOLL, supra note 92, at 19. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066, 93,069 (December 20, 2016) (codified 
at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, and 827), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-20/pdf/2016-29958.pdf. 
 98.  Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional Re-
view Act, WASH. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com 
/news/2017/may/15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congres/ (“The American 
Action Forum, a conservative-leaning think tank, calculated repealing the rules could save the 
economy millions of hours of paperwork and $3.7 billion in regulatory costs to the federal 
agencies, and perhaps $35 billion in compliance costs for industry.”); Press Release, Am. Action 
Forum, AAF Analysis Finds Congress Could Save $40 Billion in Regulatory Costs Using the 
CRA (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/aaf-analysis-finds-
congress-save-40-billion-regulatory-costs-using-cra/ (citing nearly $40 billion in regulatory 
costs). 
 99.  Dinan, supra note 98.  
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seen, however, it is actually referring to the cost estimate from agen-
cies or from industry. 
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Now that we understand the existing estimates and their limita-
tions, we can try to come up with a good faith estimate of our own 
for annual regulatory costs saved through Trump administration de-
regulatory actions. We have seen the divide in overall regulatory 
burden studies between statistical models of regulatory costs and fed-
eral agency estimates for particular rules. Cognizant of the pitfalls of 
each approach, I split regulatory savings into two categories. The first 
is “hard” regulatory savings, the reduction in cost attributable to spe-
cific completed deregulatory acts. To establish “hard” savings, I re-
view OMB’s compilation of deregulatory actions, removing rules that 
are either not specifically attributable to President Trump or which 
are only “deregulatory” in a technical sense. The second regulatory 
savings category, “soft” benefits, is composed of nebulous but im-
portant savings from things like a reduced expectation within the 
business community of near-term regulation. To get some under-
standing of the scale of “soft” benefits, I review available data on 
business investment and the various factors which would weaken 
“soft” benefits. 
A.  Distilling “Hard” Deregulatory Activities: About $200 Million 
Annually 
The first step in assessing full regulatory costs must be an ac-
counting of specific actions. The OMB estimate discussed earlier is a 
good place to start. Once we establish a clear definition for “deregu-
lation,” we can find qualifying rules among OMB’s list. 
1.  What should count as “deregulation,” and how does it differ from 
OMB’s definition? 
Defining “deregulation” in a meaningful way requires under-
standing what people actually mean by “regulation.” The original 
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meaning of the term is to control by rule, or direct.100 Scholars, poli-
ticians, and commentators who believe the federal government has 
too many requirements want to deregulate, to allow deviation from a 
federally prescribed norm. Logically, deregulation would then be re-
moving a mandatory standard for participants in a given industry. 
That simple logic does not reflect the actual classification scheme 
used by OMB. Pursuant to Executive Order 13771, OMB’s definition 
of “deregulation” is, simply, “an action that has been finalized and 
has total costs less than zero.”101 That expansive definition can lead to 
absurd situations where easing eligibility for federal benefits counts as 
deregulation if it requires less effort on the part of private entities to 
apply for the benefits. 
For the sake of simplicity, I propose adding a caveat to OMB’s 
definition: a regulatory action that amends eligibility for a federal 
benefit is not deregulation. Such actions might be independently de-
sirable on efficiency or other grounds, but they are not removing a 
mandatory standard for participation in a private industry. Such rules 
are better understood as agencies setting the terms by which agencies 
interact with outsiders, not the terms by which those outsiders can 
participate in a non-government activity. Put another way, a deregu-
latory action must reduce private sector costs that accrue primarily 
because of a federal restriction on activity, not because of an offer of 
federal funds.102 Expenses incurred in the pursuit of federal funds 
would include such obviously non-regulatory burden categories as 
lobbying expenses, job-search costs for would-be federal employees, 
time spent on grant applications, and even arguably campaign dona-
tions or parties thrown on behalf of elected officials. None of those 
expenses relate to the federal government’s standardization of private 
sector activity. 
 
 100.  Regulate, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reg-
ulate (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).  
 101.  OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMO M-
17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771, TITLED “REDUCING 
REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” (2017), https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf. 
 102.  Rules that alter the eligibility for federal benefits could be desirable in and of them-
selves, either for efficiency reasons (e.g., making a form easier to fill out) or, from a certain ide-
ological vantage point, because they reduce the size of government (e.g., imposing work re-
quirements for welfare benefits). In either case, the goal is not deregulation per se. 
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One other caveat is necessary: we must not count cost reductions 
for deregulatory actions that have not gone into effect. This is a ma-
jor departure from the OMB methodology, which counts rules once 
they are finalized. It is important at this stage to remember our origi-
nal purpose: judging the economic effect of deregulation. To achieve 
that end, it does not make sense to count rules that never actually 
forced anyone to do anything. The distinction between “finalized” 
and “in effect” may seem fine, but it is vital in assessing actual impact 
on the economy. Frequently, major rules are finalized, but then 
stayed by court action.103 While the litigation is pending—sometimes 
for years—the rule cannot fairly be said to be a regulatory burden 
since no companies actually have to meet it. On the flip side, if a de-
regulatory rule has not yet actually altered an existing requirement, 
its effect on “hard” costs is minimal. Furthermore, litigation against 
the rule might succeed, whether by outright winning in court or by 
delaying the rule’s implementation until a new president takes office 
and withdraws the rule. 
To be sure, the reduced expectation of future regulation can have 
a major economic effect. However, for purposes of our analysis, we 
will analyze those “soft” effects of deregulation separately. For now, 
we concern ourselves only with the quantifiable effects of deregulato-
ry actions already taken. 
2.  Merging OMB’s estimate of “hard” savings with actual 
deregulation 
The official federal estimate for the total cost savings of Trump’s 
deregulatory actions is $23.57 billion as of the end of fiscal year 2018, 
comprising $570 million in fiscal year 2017 and $23 billion in fiscal 
year 2018.104 As discussed earlier, the $23.57 billion figure is over an 
indefinite time horizon, meaning it is the present value of all ex-
pected future savings. The figure actually amounts to $1.6 billion an-
nually.105 These numbers must be seen as the most credible estimate 
 
 103.  The Clean Power Plan is one obvious recent example which will be discussed later 
in this article. 
 104.  OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY REFORM RESULTS 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20190608110347; 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaEO13771 (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).  
 105.  Alan Levin & Alyza Sebenius, Trump Claims $1.6 Billion a Year Saved from Cut-
ting Red Tape, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
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of “hard” regulatory savings to date, but even they must be taken 
with a grain of salt. OMB’s numbers are the product of agency esti-
mates, and the agencies in question are headed by and replete with 
Trump administration political appointees. It is in their interest to 
inflate the number as much as possible. However, OMB’s report has 
one important factor in its favor: OMB’s estimate is startlingly low. 
Because OMB had every incentive to inflate, the low estimate pre-
sents a significant case for credibility, at least as a starting point for 
our analysis.106 
 a.  How significant is $1.6 billion in annual regulatory savings?  If 
that truly is the total value of Trump deregulation, then deregulation is 
very nearly meaningless in the overall economy—a maximum $3.2 
billion drop in a roughly $40 trillion ocean of U.S. GDP in 2017 and 
2018. Worse still, because the number is only costs avoided and does not 
include the benefits given up through repeal of the rules in question, the 
true effect of deregulation would be lower still. 
From another perspective, the $1.6 billion in annual savings 
claimed by the Trump administration OMB could be as much as 2% 
of the overall regulatory burden if one accepts OMB’s total regulato-
ry burden range of $78 billion to $115 billion.107 Viewed through that 
prism, Trump’s deregulatory effort might seem more substantial. 
However, there are important caveats to that manner of examining 
the $1.6 billion figure. From a purely technical perspective, the $1.6 
billion annual figure includes the withdrawal of regulations that were 
not finalized. OMB’s overall estimate of a $78 to $115 billion burden 
counted only final rules, so the $1.6 billion in deregulatory actions 
does not directly compare to the $78 to $115 billion estimate of an-
nual overall cost. 
 
news/articles/2018-10-17/trump-administration-claims-23-billion-in-regulation-savings. 
 106.  This is analogous to the criterion of embarrassment in biblical interpretation, which 
broadly suggests that parts of the Bible which would have been most embarrassing for the au-
thors to concede are the most likely to be grounded in historical fact. If they were not grounded 
in fact, why would the authors include them? See, e.g., JOHN P. MEIER, A MARGINAL JEW: 
RETHINKING THE HISTORICAL JESUS. VOLUME I: RETHINKING THE HISTORICAL JESUS, 
ANCHOR BIBLE REFERENCE LIBRARY 168 (1991). 
 107. 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. 
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 b.  Narrowing the OMB list of deregulatory rules  A more 
substantial flaw in the OMB list is its legalistic methodology. Few of the 
actions included are the sort one would associate with real, substantive 
deregulation. Some background is necessary to appreciate this point. By 
OMB terminology, a significant regulation has a non-zero economic 
effect; major regulation has an economic effect of greater than $100 
million.108 
At the end of fiscal year 2018, OMB reported eliminating 176 
regulatory actions while issuing “only 14 new significant regulatory 
actions,” concluding that it had achieved a twelve to one ratio of de-
regulatory to regulatory actions.109 This is misleading. OMB is com-
paring all deregulatory actions with new significant regulatory ac-
tions. There were actually fifty-seven significant deregulatory actions 
compared to fourteen significant regulatory actions—a four to one 
ratio on significant actions. However, one can break the numbers 
down further by including only major actions. There were nineteen 
major actions, four of which were classified as regulatory.110 We are 
now reduced to a universe of fifteen major deregulatory actions. 
Of those fifteen actions, twelve are primarily concerned with re-
distributing payments among program recipients or changing the 
manner in which people or entities are billed or compensated under 
existing federal programs. These actions are considered “deregulato-
ry” by OMB because they incidentally reduce private sector costs, but 
under the definition of “deregulation” developed above, they should 
not be considered deregulatory. These actions do not relate to re-
strictions on activities by the private sector. Rather, they relate to the 
manner in which outside groups obtain federal benefits. The purpose 
 
 108. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 
101, at 3; 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.  
 109.  OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 2018 
REGULATORY REFORM REPORT: CUTTING THE RED TAPE, UNLEASHING ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM 3 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-Unified-
Agenda-Cutting-the-Red-Tape.pdf. 
 110.  OMB categorized 20 major deregulatory actions, but actual inspection of the rules 
reveals one that was apparently miscategorized. A rule on disposal of coal combustion residues 
was classified major by OMB in its report, but the regulatory impact analysis associated with the 
rule says it is not a major rule. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal 
of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum 
Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36,435, 36,451 (Jul. 30, 2018) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 257), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/07/30/2018-16262/haz-
ardous-and-solid-waste-management-system-disposal-of-coal-combustion-residuals-from-
electric. 
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of the actions is thus not related to reducing regulatory burden on 
the private sector, and it is not reasonable to consider them part of a 
broader deregulatory agenda. 
As an example typical of the twelve actions in question, the Medi-
care rule “Updates to the Quality Payment Program” tweaks an exist-
ing program offering higher Medicare payment rates for physicians 
who follow best practices for treatment.111 Adjustments to the meth-
ods of evaluating physician performance for calendar year 2018 re-
sulted in a $13.9 million reduction to the private sector cost of col-
lecting the information required to participate in the program.112 
However, the agency predicts those changes will lead to “[a]dditional 
federal expenditures includ[ing] approximately $675 to $900 million 
in [] incentive payments to [qualifying physicians].”113 This is an ac-
tion that increases federal expenditures by almost a billion dollars, 
but counts as deregulatory because it reduces the cost to doctors of 
filling out paperwork to access federal benefits. The action is, in all 
probability, perfectly reasonable. However, it is silly to consider it 
part of a deregulatory agenda. 
Without those twelve actions, we are left with only three major 
deregulatory actions that qualify as “deregulatory” consistent with 
the criteria outlined earlier. I will describe each rule in detail below. 
 c.  The major Trump deregulatory acts that have taken effect.  One 
of the three major deregulatory acts changed the definition of an 
“employer” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).114 Without getting into the technical details, the change 
enables many more people to qualify for association health plans, which 
are a lower-cost, lower-coverage alternative outside of the Affordable 
Care Act. While clearly deregulatory in the sense of allowing citizens to 
do something they could not do before, expanding the availability of 
association health plans does not unambiguously reduce regulatory costs. 
Indeed, the agency noted in the Federal Register, “On balance, deficit 
increasing effects are likely to dominate, making the proposal’s net 
 
 111.  Medicare Program; CY 2018 Updates to the Quality Payment Program; and Quali-
ty Payment Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstance Policy for the Transition 
Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568, 53,569 (Nov. 16, 2017) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 414), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2017-11-16/2017-24067.  
 112.  Id. at 53,577. 
 113.  Id. 
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impact on the federal budget negative.”115 As for overall effects, the 
agency could only state: “While the impacts of this proposed rule, and of 
AHPs themselves, are intended to be positive on net, the incidence, 
nature and magnitude of both positive and negative effects are 
uncertain.”116 Since the agency proposing the rule does not itself feel 
comfortable asserting specific regulatory cost savings from this 
“deregulatory” action, it stands to reason we should not assign any. 
The second of the three major deregulatory actions is the “Om-
nibus Essential Fish Habitat Amendment 2,” which allows greater 
fishing in some areas off the shore of the northeastern United 
States.117 The issuing agencies under the Department of Commerce 
predicted annualized cost savings of $60 to $62 million.118 Some 
commentators have pointed out that this rule simply adopted the 
recommendations of the New England Fishery Management Coun-
cil, which were issued in December 2016, before the Trump admin-
istration took office. Even if its genesis arguably predates the Trump 
administration, the rule does reduce a classic regulatory burden: re-
striction of access to public land. We can consider it an actual de-
regulatory action. 
The third of the three major deregulatory actions is probably the 
most prominent: rescinding a 2016 regulation requiring greater cap-
ture of methane generated while drilling for oil on federal and Indian 
lands.119 The cost savings from that rule depend slightly on perspec-
tive. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) stated that the action 
would reduce compliance costs for energy companies by $1.32 to 
$2.03 billion over ten years.120 BLM did not subtract from that figure 
the value of the methane captured, which would directly accrue to 
the entities bearing the regulatory burden. Sale of the methane cap-
tured under the rule was expected to produce $629 to $824 million 
 
 114.  Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans, 
83 Fed. Reg. 614 (Jan. 5, 2018) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 115.  Id. at 632. 
 116.  Id. at 626. 
 117.  Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries 
of the Northeastern United States; Essential Fish Habitat, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,492 (Nov. 6, 2017) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). 
 118.  Id. at 51,497. 
 119.  Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at 
43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170). 
 120.  Id. at 7939. 
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over the same time span.121 If one subtracts the revenue accrued from 
methane sales, the cost reduction is $496 million to $1.4 billion over 
ten years. On an annualized basis, that amounts to $71 to $199 mil-
lion. A deregulatory action, sure, but, like the fishing rule, one that 
carries relatively minor cost savings. 
From this review of OMB’s list of deregulatory actions, we derive 
a sum total of “hard” savings of $131 to $261 million annually: $71 to 
$199 million from repeal of the methane capture rule, and $60 to $62 
million from the fisheries rule. If we generously date those rule 
changes to the beginning of his administration, President Trump re-
duced “hard” regulatory costs by $262 to $522 million total by the 
end of fiscal year 2018.122 
3.  Will major deregulatory actions currently under way dramatically 
change the tally? 
OMB’s fiscal year 2018 review covered only finalized actions, so 
it is worth taking stock of major regulatory actions that have since 
been finalized or will likely be finalized before the end of President 
Trump’s first term. While those actions are not relevant for deter-
mining regulatory savings’ role in current economic growth because 
they have not gone into effect, we should consider whether they 
would meaningfully affect the overall estimation of Trump admin-
istration deregulation. Upon review, it is unlikely that these major 
rules would significantly contribute to economic growth. 
 a.  Clean Power Plan repeal and replacement.  Some of the biggest 
potential sources of regulatory savings present the most difficult 
methodological issues: the Clean Power Plan (CPP) and the redefinition 
of “waters of the United States” rule (WOTUS). 
The CPP was finalized under President Obama in 2015, then 
stayed in February 2016 by the Supreme Court.123 That litigation was 
still ongoing when President Trump came into office.124 The D.C. 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Assuming a 7% discount rate, as the Trump administration OMB does in its dis-
counting calculations. See, e.g., id. 
 123.  Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, (S. Ct. February 9, 2016) (No. 
15A773), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr_21p3.pdf. 
 124.  See Supplemental Brief of Respondent EPA in Support of Abeyance, West Virginia 
v. EPA (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2017) (No. 15-1363), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
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Circuit essentially halted proceedings pending potential settlement.125 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) subsequently an-
nounced it would repeal the CPP and replace it with the Affordable 
Clean Energy (ACE) plan.126 The EPA finalized the rule repealing 
the CPP and replacing it with ACE on July 8, 2019, with ACE taking 
effect on September 6, 2019.127 Both the repeal and the replacement 
plan will likely be the subject of litigation, and the fate of both ac-
tions is unclear. 
The extent to which the attempt to switch from CPP to ACE has 
resulted in regulatory savings is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
At the very least, even if the repeal and replace actions get stuck in 
court until after Trump’s presidency, there are cost savings involved 
in the absence of the CPP for four years. Against that logic, though 
the CPP has not gone into effect yet, it is easy to envision a scenario 
in which it does. To wit, legal challenges to both the repeal of the 
CPP and the promulgation of ACE could be successful, and then the 
EPA would be forced to keep the CPP. Or, if the courts do not issue 
a final ruling before the 2020 elections, a new administration could 
abandon the repeal and replace effort, allowing CPP to go into effect. 
One aspect of the repeal and replace effort makes its immediate 
effects easy to estimate. Under the ACE rule, states have three years 
from September 6, 2019 to propose how they will comply with the 
rule. The ACE rule has thus likely not caused any significant regula-
tory costs as of the publication of this article. At the same time, given 
that the CPP never took effect, it is not clear that we should accord 
any savings to the repeal effort. And, as stated earlier, the repeal ef-
fort might be derailed by lawsuits, or delayed until after the election 
when another president might abandon the repeal. It is premature to 




 125.  See Order No. 15-1363, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017), 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-
documents/2017/20170428_docket-15-1363_order.pdf. 
 126. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA.GOV, (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20181231222845/https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-
proposes-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule. 
 127.  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/08/2019-13507/repeal-of-the-
clean-power-plan-emission-guidelines-for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-existing. 
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There can be “soft” cost savings from the repeal effort even if its 
legal status remains in limbo. Companies presumably make invest-
ments to become compliant with the rule, perhaps before it is even 
finalized. If a company were on the verge of investing to comply with 
the CPP in November 2016, then canceled those investments after 
the election of President Trump, that seems like paradigmatic savings 
from deregulation. Those effects would be evident in our discussion 
of “soft” benefits, so we need not consider them here. 
Of course, speculation about avoided investments to comply with 
regulation has a flip side as well. Companies that already made in-
vestments to comply with the CPP may have gained little or nothing 
from the deregulation. Indeed, those companies may suffer as much 
by the deregulation as the initial regulation if the investments in 
compliance rendered them uncompetitive with other companies that 
did not make similar investments. 
While the net effect of these competing forces is unclear, in theo-
ry, the net effect of the potential repeal of the CPP would be counted 
under the “soft” effects methodology, which will be discussed at 
length later in this article. 
 b.  Waters of the United States redefinition.  WOTUS presents a 
different issue: a rule that is partially in effect. The Obama 
administration EPA issued a clarification of the term “waters of the 
United States,” used in the Clean Water Act to describe EPA’s 
jurisdiction to regulate water.128 Multiple lawsuits ensued.129 The rule 
was stayed by a district court in August 2015, hours before it was to take 
effect.130 The Trump administration proposed and finalized a rule 
repealing the 2015 definition, and a rule replacing that would reduce the 
 
 128.  Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054 (Jun. 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 
230, 232, 300, 302, and 401), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/06/29/2015-
13435/clean-water-rule-definition-of-waters-of-the-united-states. 
 129.  See, e.g., Pam MacLean, Sixteen States Sue EPA over Clean Water Rule, REUTERS 
(Jun. 29, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-environment-water-epa/sixteen-states-
sue-epa-over-clean-water-rule-idUSKCN0P92QJ20150629. 
 130.  See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, North Dakota v. EPA (D. N.D. 2015), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/north-dakota/nddce/3:2015cv00059/31173/70/0.pdf?ts=1440758970. 
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scope of EPA’s jurisdiction.131 As of this writing, some states are still 
governed by the pre-2015 standard, and some are governed by the 2015 
standard.132 
The crux of the WOTUS dilemma is whether to count deregula-
tory benefits from a rule that technically is in effect in some places 
and not others. The intuitive “fair” answer would be to count the 
benefits from undoing WOTUS in the states where it has gone into 
effect and not to count the savings from states where it has not gone 
into effect. EPA did not publish its cost-benefit analysis in a state-by-
state breakdown, however, so this approach is easier to conceive than 
to execute. 
As of this drafting, WOTUS is in effect in 26 states, dispropor-
tionately states with smaller GDP.133 So, to the extent there are regu-
latory savings from the repeal effort, they would come from those 
states. 
Another methodologically messy aspect of the WOTUS repeal is 
that the Trump administration argues states will regulate some of the 
areas over which EPA would have had jurisdiction under the Obama-
era WOTUS definition.134 If state regulators do not take up the slack, 
the avoided costs of the WOTUS rule are much greater. 
The two sources of uncertainty—application in some states and 
not others, and how state regulators react to the withdrawal of EPA 
jurisdiction—can be set against each other to create a rough but fair 
estimate. We know the pre-2015 rule is already in effect in half of the 
states, so the benefits of going back to the pre-2015 rule are zero for 
them. We can thus reasonably choose EPA’s estimate for savings ac-
 
 131.  See Press Release, EPA, EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule, Ensuring 
Reliable, Diversified Energy Resources while Protecting our Environment (Jun. 19, 2019), 
EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ens-
uring-reliable-diversified-energy. 
 132.  See Definition of “Waters of the United States”: Rule Status and Litigation Update, 
EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/definition-waters-united-states-rule-status-and-lit-
igation-update (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
 133.  Seven of the 10 largest states by GDP are not currently subject to WOTUS—
California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey. See LAURA GATZ, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45424, “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” (WOTUS): 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE 2015 CLEAN WATER RULE (Dec. 12, 2018)., https://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R45424.pdf. 
 134.  Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4201 (Feb. 
14, 2019) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 
300, 302, and 401). https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/revised 
_definition_of_waters_of_the_united_states.pdf. 
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cruing if most states do regulate the waters in question. The span of 
EPA’s range of avoided costs is massive: $28 to $497 million.135 Hew-
ing to the lower end of that range to compensate for states where the 
Obama WOTUS never went into effect, we can select $100 million 
in annual savings as a realistic if somewhat arbitrary choice. If the 
WOTUS definition change survives court appeal, the cost reduction 
contributed by this particular case would likely not dramatically 
swing the overall estimate of deregulatory cost savings. 
 c.  Outer continental shelf energy exploitation.  On January 4, 2018, 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) released a draft 
proposal for outer-continental shelf development over the period 2019–
2024.136 That plan would partially replace an Obama-era plan for 2017–
2022.137 On its face, the plan opened up a wide array of new offshore 
territory for oil and gas leases, most notably in the mid-Atlantic, off the 
gulf coast, and off the Alaskan coast.138 However, BOEM has not yet 
released a final proposal, and what areas will be opened for lease remains 
unclear. For example, then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke 
announced that Florida’s offshore areas would be exempted from oil and 
gas leases, prompting calls for additional exemptions from many other 
states.139 
Even if the final plan sticks closely to the draft plan, it is still very 
difficult to estimate the cost savings. There will only be “savings” if 
the oil and gas industries actually lease the areas in question. The ex-
tent of subsequent exploitation is also an open question—most leases 
are essentially left fallow, to be used only if the price of oil reaches a 
certain level. For example, in the western Gulf of Mexico, as of April 
2019, there were 310 active leases, but only fifty-eight of them were 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., NATIONAL OCS OIL AND GAS LEASING 
PROGRAM, https://www.boem.gov/National-OCS-Program/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
 137.  See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2017–2022 OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM (2016), https://www.boem.gov/ 
2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP/. 
 138.  See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2019–2024 NATIONAL OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM (2018), 
https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024/. 
 139.  See Ryan Zinke (@SecretaryZinke), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/secretaryzinke/status/950870010242719745?lang=en; Pamela King, States 
Call for the Fla. Treatment in their case against drilling, E&E News (Jan. 18, 2018). 
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actually producing oil or gas.140 That decision will depend on the cur-
rent and expected future price of oil and natural gas. As of this writ-
ing, offshore leases under Trump have actually yielded less revenue 
than lease sales under Obama, a fact largely attributable to lower oil 
prices under Trump and more easily recoverable resources onshore 
in recent years.141 
There is also a significant chance that some or all of the proposed 
plan will be blocked in court as arbitrary and capricious. Secretary 
Zinke seemed to announce the exemption of Florida by tweet, citing 
then-Governor Rick Scott’s leadership: “As a result of discussion with 
Governor Scott’s [sic] and his leadership, I am removing Florida 
from consideration for any new oil and gas platforms.”142 That expla-
nation drew immediate suggestion that decisions not to exempt other 
areas would lead to lawsuits alleging an arbitrary and capricious pro-
cess of granting exemptions.143 
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to offer a reasonable 
guess as to the regulatory cost savings from the Trump administra-
tion’s plan to open up more area for leasing. It seems safe to assume 
that opening more areas for drilling will not cause regulatory costs to 
go up, but whether they go down and by how much is essentially im-
possible to determine. In any event, the proposed plan has not been 
finalized, and given the low price of oil, it is unlikely that the addi-
tional available land will significantly affect total regulatory savings. 
 d.  Opening up land for energy exploration.  The Trump 
administration has made opening onshore land for oil and gas 
production a top priority, which has had a significant effect on 
production. BLM reported $358 million in revenue from oil and gas 
leases in 2017, representing an 86% increase from 2016.144 In 2018, that 
 
 140.  BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT, COMBINED LEASING REPORT (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.boem.gov/Combined-Leasing-Statistics-April-2019/. 
 141.  Nichola Groom, U.S. Gulf Oil, Gas Lease Sale Sees Higher Interest from Drillers, 
KITCO NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.kitco.com/news/2019-03-20/U-S-Gulf-
oil-gas-lease-sale-sees-higher-interest-from-drillers.html.  
 142.  Ryan Zinke (@SecretaryZinke), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:48 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SecretaryZinke/status/950876846698180608. 
 143.  Umair Irfan, Florida Got an Exemption to the Offshore Drilling Plan, VOX (Jan. 12, 
2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/1/10/16870450/ocs-
offshore-drilling-oil-gas-lease-zinke-florida. 
 144.  Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM Oil and Gas Lease Sales Generate $360 Million in 
2017, WWW.BLM.GOV, (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-oil-and-gas-
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figure shot up another 205% to $1.1 billion.145 That figure is just the 
federal share of the benefits. 
It is possible to make a rough calculation of private sector bene-
fits from these actions. The Department of the Interior released a re-
port in fiscal year 2017 stating that oil, gas, and coal production on 
federal lands and waters generated $67.22 billion in direct economic 
contributions.146 Of that total, roughly three-quarters are from on-
shore production.147 The leased area that produced that value was 
25.7 million acres.148 Put another way, the leased area produced about 
$2,600 per acre leased. The Trump administration’s lease sales were 
for about 793,000 acres in 2017 and 1.5 million acres in 2018.149 If we 
assume equal productivity from existing and new federal leased areas, 
the 2017 and 2018 sales generated $2.1 billion and $3.9 billion re-
spectively. 
That is not, however, the end of the calculation. From that total, 
we should subtract the average annual newly leased acreage under the 
Obama administration. The regulatory “burden” relieved by the 
Trump administration through the lease sales is the newly leased land 
beyond what the Obama administration would have leased anyway. 
The average BLM annual lease sale from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal 
year 2016 was 1.35 million acres, comparable to Trump administra-
tion leases in either 2017 or 2018.150 
Another complication is pending lawsuits. A federal court has al-
ready frozen 300,000 acres leased under the Trump administration in 
Wyoming. The judge in that case ruled that the sale was arbitrary 
and capricious because the Trump administration did not take into 
 
lease-sales-generate-360-million-2017. 
 145.  Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Energy Revolution Unleashed: Interior Shat-
ters Previous Records with $1.1 Billion in 2018 Oil and Gas Lease Sales (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.doi.gov/news/energy-revolution-unleashed-interior-shatters-previous-records-11-
billion-2018-oil-and-gas. 
 146.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ECONOMIC REPORT FY 2017, 11 (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/fy_2017_econ_report_final_11_1_18.pdf.  
 147.  See MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42432, U.S. CRUDE OIL AND 
NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL AREAS 3 (2018), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42432. 
 148.  Id. at 9.  
 149.  See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 146. 
 150.  See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OIL AND GAS STATISTICS tbl.4, 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2018).  
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account the effect of the carbon released through expanded use of oil 
and gas.151 300,000 acres is actually larger than the difference be-
tween the average newly leased acreage under Obama (1.35 million 
acres) and the 1.5 million acres leased by Trump in 2018. We are 
thus in the bizarre situation where the slipshod manner of the Trump 
administration’s deregulatory action could actually mean that the net 
regulatory burden increased. 
All these data points dampen the potential deregulatory impact of 
the land leases. If we simply ignore the litigation hold on the 300,000 
acres, the impact of the additional lease sales under President Trump 
was something like $650 million in 2018. 
The above analysis suggests that, at $650 million, increased fed-
eral land leases are one of the largest sources of deregulatory cost sav-
ings under President Trump. However, this amount is still an incre-
mental increase in deregulatory savings, not an economic game-
changer. Furthermore, if the theory of regulatory burden in this case 
is that perfectly good land was available for lease but held back be-
cause of regulatory caprice, it stands to reason that such land will de-
cline in quantity as the Trump administration proceeds. We should 
therefore expect that the cost savings will not be $650 million every 
year.152 
 
 151.  Juliet Eilperin, Federal Judge Demands Trump Administration Reveal How Its 
Drilling Plans Will Fuel Climate Change, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:27 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/03/20/federal-judge-casts-doubt-
trumps-drilling-plans-across-us-because-they-ignore-climate-change/. 
 152.  The price of oil and gas will have a much larger impact on these benefits than the 
amount of land leased. A considerable portion of leased land is not productive every year pre-
cisely because it is only economical to work that land at certain oil prices. See HUMPHRIES, 
supra note 147, at 9 (showing about half of leased onshore land is not productive). 
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 e.  Freezing CAFE standards.  In July 2018, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration and EPA proposed freezing Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and carbon dioxide standards for 
passenger cars and light trucks for model years 2021 through 2026.153 
They issued a joint draft regulatory impact analysis for the proposed 
rule.154 
If the proposed rule goes into effect and the agencies’ draft cost 
estimates are taken at face value, freezing CAFE and CO2 standards 
is the single most consequential act in the deregulatory agenda by a 
vast margin. The agencies project annualized cost savings of $19.2 to 
$24.2 billion.155 
As with other non-finalized rules, there are a number of reasons 
to discount the significance of these projects. First, the rule has not 
been finalized and is not in effect, so these projections do not help us 
explain the current economic boom. Second, even if the rule were fi-
nalized, the significant savings would not start kicking in until 2021, 
at which point President Trump might no longer be in office.156  
As with other major rules not yet in effect, a future administra-
tion could change the rules again. A court could also overturn the 
rule, as with the other examples discussed above. There is even a 
strong possibility that states like California will institute their own 
CAFE-like standards.157 Because of the size of the California market, 
manufacturers might be forced to follow those standards, undoing 
most of the cost savings anticipated by the federal rule.158 
This is most likely the rule where only considering regulatory 
costs and ignoring benefits gives the most skewed perspective. CAFE 
 
 153.  U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL EFFICIENT (SAFE) 
VEHICLES PROPOSED RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021-2026, EPA.GOV, 
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/safer-affordable-fuel-
efficient-safe-vehicles-proposed (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). 
 154. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN. & U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, THE SAFER 
AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021-2026 
PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS (July 2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/ 
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ld_cafe_my2021-26_pria_0.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L HIGHWAY 
SAFETY ADMIN.]. 
 155.  Id. at 13. 
 156.  See id. at 33. Note that the standards are unaffected until 2021. 
 157.  Coral Davenport, Automakers Plan for Their Worst Nightmare: Regulatory Chaos 
After Trump’s Emissions Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/04/10/climate/auto-emissions-cafe-rollback-trump.html.  
 158.  See id. 
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standards have a vast impact because they relate to most automobile 
purchases in a country that buys around $80 billion in cars a 
month.159 As with the tweaks to Medicare transfer rules discussed ear-
lier, the sheer volume of trade being regulated means small “deregu-
latory” acts will carry an outsized effect. Thus, even a small tweak to 
CAFE standards will have a vast effect on regulatory costs. 
The real distortion here comes from looking at costs and not 
benefits of regulation. While every regulation we have discussed has 
benefits, in the paradigmatic regulatory case, the costs are mostly 
monetary, and the benefits come in the form of health improvements 
or the like. CAFE standards, by contrast, have an obvious immediate 
economic benefit: lowering fuel costs for consumers.160 The regula-
tion has some deadweight loss because consumers might not want 
more fuel-efficient cars. However, a large portion of the costs and 
benefits are simply a tradeoff between increased cost of cars and in-
creased cost of fuel. 
To more clearly illustrate that phenomenon, imagine a situation 
where there are two possible building materials for the $1 billion wa-
ter bottle market: plastic and steel. Assume consumers are essentially 
indifferent between the two such that without regulation, the market 
is 50% plastic bottles, 50% steel bottles. Then imagine EPA issues a 
regulation banning plastic water bottles because it is discovered that 
the plastic causes cancer. Even ignoring the health benefits, the costs 
and benefits are essentially equal. Assume further that former plastic 
consumers smoothly transition to steel, and steel manufacturers hire 
the workers who formerly made plastic bottles. 
This scenario highlights the slipperiness of “regulatory burden” 
as a concept. There are winners and losers, but the economy overall 
is not harmed. However, in our exercise of only counting regulatory 
costs, it appears that this regulation had a $500 million cost. To dis-
till the essence of the problem, when a regulation is essentially just 
the government forcing a move along the Pareto frontier (i.e., mov-
ing from one state of maximum utility to a different but equal in utili-
ty state), examining only the regulatory costs will mislead as to the 
 
 159.  See RETAIL SALES: AUTOMOBILE DEALERS, FRED, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Lou-
is, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MRTSSM4411USN (last updated Mar. 17, 2020). 
 160.  There are, of course, other benefits to CAFE standards, e.g., lower CO2 emissions. 
That sort of benefit is more typical of an ordinary regulation, where the public at large accrues 
the benefits in a less direct way than straightforward lower costs. 
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actual importance of the regulation. The more a regulation resembles 
this situation, the more misleading the costs-only approach will be. 
As applied to President Trump’s proposed CAFE standards, an-
nualized cost savings are $19.2 to $24.2 billion, but net annualized 
savings are only $6.7 to $9.5 billion.161 If the proposed CAFE stand-
ards end up going into effect, those savings would still be larger than 
all the finalized deregulatory actions to date, but the savings are not 
hugely significant in the context of the overall economy. 
Ultimately, we cannot count the CAFE and CO2 standards to-
ward regulatory benefits of the administration thus far because the 
rules are not finalized and have not gone into effect. Indeed, Califor-
nia recently reached an agreement with the automotive industry on a 
different set of standards that would render the new federal CAFE 
and CO2 standards moot.162 However, the case raises methodological 
questions that cast uncertainty on the relatively large potential regu-
latory savings of this purported deregulation victory.163 
 f.  Tariffs: non-traditional additions to the “regulatory burden”?  
If one were to define the “regulatory burden,” a perfectly serviceable 
definition might be “the cost of requirements on the private sector 
imposed by the executive branch without congressional 
involvement.” Tariffs seem to fit that definition perfectly well, as 
they impose an obligation to pay additional money to purchase goods 
from certain providers. In practice, businesses may end up uprooting 
existing business arrangements to avoid the tariff, the sort of activity 
usually considered a cost of regulation. 
Most traditional accounting of regulatory costs do not include 
tariffs. A plausible reason for the omission is that a tariff seems more 
like a tax than a regulation. Historically, tariffs were used more for 
 
 161.  NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 154, at 13. 
 162.  See Shannon Van Sant, California Signs Deal with Automakers to Produce Fuel-
Efficient Cars, NPR (Jul. 25, 2019, 9:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/745389326 
/california-signs-deal-with-automakers-to-produce-fuel-efficient-cars. 
 163.  Among other things, experts question the assertion that freezing CAFE standards 
will result in 6 million fewer cars being on the road by 2029. See, e.g., Jessica McDonald, The 
Facts on Fuel Economy Standards, FACTCHECK.ORG (May 3, 2019), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2019/05/the-facts-on-fuel-economy-standards/. Other studies claim 
that the NHTSA ignored 6 million used cars, and that incorporating those cars into the calcu-
lations wipe out the supposed benefits of the new rules. Rules to Boost Fuel Economy for Vehi-
cles Will Do More Good Than Harm, New Study Shows, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://phys.org/news/2018-12-boost-fuel-economy-vehicles-good.html. 
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their revenue-generating capacity than as a method to regulate the 
economy. In the Trump administration, however, tariffs are fre-
quently framed as a “trade war” and used as a means to alter the 
economy, specifically to increase the domestically produced share in 
markets ranging from solar panels to dairy products. It is difficult to 
come up with a substantive, non-formalistic reason not to consider 
tariffs as a form of regulation in this context. 
Practically, most assessments of regulatory burden probably do 
not include tariffs because under current law, the executive branch 
does not need to produce a detailed regulatory impact analysis for 
new tariffs like it has to for proposed rules. Without a formal federal 
analysis, we must rely on outside sources, which can be biased or use 
shoddy methodology. Still, as discussed below, the range of estimates 
established by academic and industry sources suggest the costs of the 
trade war far outstrip the savings due to deregulation. 
Two National Bureau of Economic Research papers have as-
sessed the costs of the trade war as $7.2 billion and $16.8 billion an-
nually.164 One assessment of the U.S.-China trade war cited in the 
New York Times estimated that current planned tariffs on both sides 
of the trade war would reduce U.S. GDP growth by 0.3% annually, 
or roughly $64 billion.165 Reuters described the consensus estimate of 
direct U.S. losses from the trade war thus far as 0.1–0.2% of GDP, 
which would amount to $21 to $43 billion annually.166  
A caveat to this line of reasoning is that the losses cited above do 
not discriminate between losses due to U.S. tariffs and losses due to 
Chinese tariffs. However, it seems fair to note that the Trump ad-
ministration started the current trade war, and retaliatory tariffs are 
 
 164.  Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et. al, The Return to Protectionism (NBER, Working Paper 
No. 25638, 2019) (estimating $7.2 billion in aggregate real income loss); Mary Amiti et. al., 
The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare (NBER, Working Paper No. 
25672, 2019) (estimating $1.4 billion in monthly cost). 
 165.  Peter S. Goodman, The Global Economy Was Improving. Then the Fighting Re-
sumed., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/us-china-
trade-war-economy.html (estimating 0.3% annual GDP loss); U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BEA 20–07, (2019), 
https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019-
second-estimate [hereinafter BEA 2019 ESTIMATE] (estimating 2019 GDP at $21.429 trillion).  
 166.  Marius Zaharia, Explainer: Counting the Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War So 
Far, REUTERS (May 6, 2019, 3:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-
explainer/explainer-counting-the-cost-of-the-u-s-china-trade-war-so-far-idUSKCN1SC0N2; 
BEA 2019 ESTIMATE, supra note 165 (estimating 2019 GDP at $21.429 trillion). 
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reasonably foreseeable costs to imposing tariffs. The administration 
undoubtedly thought the benefits would outweigh the costs, but that 
is precisely the rationale for regulation offered by every president, 
and we are only tallying costs in this exercise. Additional tariffs have 
been imposed on steel, aluminum, solar panels, and washing ma-
chines. 
Even taking the low end of the estimate range, the regulatory 
burden imposed by tariffs is larger than the most sanguine estimates 
of “hard” deregulatory cost savings by the Trump administration. 
B.  Estimating “Soft” Effects of Deregulation 
While it is relatively easy to examine “hard” estimates of cost sav-
ings from deregulation, those estimates could never plausibly account 
for major macroeconomic effects on the economy. To find some as-
pect of deregulation that could act on a macroeconomic level, we 
need to estimate the “soft” savings—the economic effect of the de-
creased expectation of regulation driven by the executive branch. 
That decreased expectation could arise from the specific deregulatory 
acts described above as well as by simple rhetoric. For example, Pres-
ident Trump has mentioned “deregulation” or criticized excessive 
regulation sixty-three times to date on Twitter during his presiden-
cy.167 The decreased expectation of regulation could in theory lead to 
increased investment, increased entrepreneurship, and decreased 
marginal compliance costs (e.g., hiring one less in-house compliance 
lawyer). 
A full examination of the relevant data shows no strong evidence 
for the existence of “soft” effects that can be distinguished from 
broader economic trends. There was an increase in business invest-
ment in 2017 that was slightly more pronounced in the United States 
than Europe, but not significantly so, and to detect any difference 
one must choose the right date range. In the two months following 
President Trump’s election, business confidence increased more in 
Europe than in the United States. Without evidence of unique “soft” 
deregulatory benefits in the United States, and keeping in mind the 
 
 167.  See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 2, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1123987855053873154; Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldrump), TWITTER (Aug 7, 2017, 4:09 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonald 
trump/status/894515865802223616. 
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evidence of significant state and judicial pushback, there is a strong 
case for assessing “soft” deregulatory benefits under the Trump ad-
ministration as almost zero. 
1.  Lack of clear evidence on a general slowdown in regulation 
Before embarking on an empirical approach to estimating “soft” 
effects, we should discuss the difficulty of proving a general slow-
down in regulation in the first place. Intuitively, it seems obvious that 
there has been a regulatory slowdown under President Trump, a 
claim enthusiastically made by both the President’s supporters and 
detractors.168 Surprisingly, a closer look reveals that the evidence is 
somewhat equivocal. CEI, the entity that issued the “Tip of the 
Costberg” report discussed at length earlier in this article, hosted a 
congratulatory blog post on the Trump administration’s 2018 dereg-
ulatory efforts.169 The perceived success highlighted in the post relied 
on the number of discrete rules and the total pages printed in the 
Federal Register in each year. To its credit, CEI noted the ways in 
which page counts and discrete rules do not directly measure regula-
tory burden.170 Other methods focus on the use of imperative lan-
guage, i.e., how often words like “shall” appear.171 
While it is worthwhile to attempt to measure regulatory burden, 
these methods are, at best, rudimentary. At worst, they are meaning-
less. There is no reason the repeal of a given rule (i.e., a deregulatory 
action) would be shorter in word or page count than the original 
adoption, especially if the rule is relatively old. And if, as is often the 
case, the original rule is being replaced by a less restrictive rule (e.g., 
the CPP repeal), the new rule will logically have a similar or identical 
 
 168.  See, e.g., David L. Bahnsen, Sometimes Trump: Now More Than Ever, NAT’L 
REV., (July 30, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/sometimes-donald-
trump-now-more-than-ever/ (crediting “the sweeping efforts at deregulation” of the Trump 
administration for the state of the economy). 
 169.  Clyde Wayne Crews, Trump’s 2018 Deregulatory Effort: 3,367 Rules, 68,082 Pag-
es, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://cei.org/blog/trumps-2018-
deregulatory-effort-3367-rules-68082-pages.  
 170.  Among other reasons, there is no inherent reason to expect a different page count 
for a deregulatory action, a moderately strict regulatory action, and a very strict regulatory ac-
tion. Since each deregulatory action is a “rule,” simply counting rules is also misleading. In ad-
dition, of course, one massively expensive rule can easily outweigh a hundred smaller rules. 
 171.  See, e.g., Patrick McLaughlin, Regulatory Data on Trump’s First Year, MERCATUS 
CTR. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-data-trump-first-year. 
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amount of imperative language. A simple example: “the limit on par-
ticulate matter shall be 1 part per billion” and “the limit on particular 
matter shall be 0.1 parts per billion” would show up as identical in 
the methodologies described above despite the latter being 90% less 
restrictive. 
Statistics aside, while the Trump administration has clearly pro-
posed (but not necessarily put into effect) many deregulatory acts that 
a Hillary Clinton administration would not have proposed, it is diffi-
cult to determine evidence to support this assumption. It is easy to 
observe that the Trump administration advocates for more deregula-
tion than the Clinton administration likely would have. It is far more 
difficult to identify specific rules the Clinton administration would 
have issued that the Trump administration has not. The Obama ad-
ministration had already acted in areas like climate change, CAFE 
standards, WOTUS, etc. What other major rules would the Clinton 
Administration have pushed? 
The clearest example of a new issue where a different administra-
tion may have pursued a different course is EPA regulation of per and 
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Used primarily for firefighting, 
PFAS chemicals have been found to contaminate drinking water. 
PFAS creates birth defects; affects growth, learning, and behavior of 
infants; increases risk of cancer; and increases cholesterol levels.172 
Researchers have indicated that there are PFAS-contaminated sites in 
forty-three states.173 
Democrats have alleged that the Trump EPA is not moving fast 
enough to create drinking water standards for PFAS.174 The Obama-
era EPA recommended that water should not contain more than sev-
enty parts per trillion of PFAS and similar chemicals, but the Trump-
 
 172.  See Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) and Your Health, AGENCY FOR 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/pfas/health-effects.html 
(last updated Jan. 21, 2020); Zeyan Liew et. al, Developmental Exposures to Perfluoroalkyl 
Substances (PFASs): An Update of Associated Health Outcomes, U.S. National Library of 
Medicine (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6348874/. 
 173.  Brian Pascus, New Study Claims 43 States Expose Millions to Dangerous Chemical 
in Drinking Water, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drinking-
water-may-contain-pfas-chemicals-in-43-states-according-to-new-study-by-environmental-
working-group/.  
 174.  Rebecca Beitsch, Lawmakers, Trump Agencies Set for Clash Over Chemicals in 
Water, THE HILL (May 27, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/445514-
lawmakers-trump-agencies-set-for-clash-over-chemicals-in-water.  
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era EPA has yet to take action.175 We might guess that a Clinton ad-
ministration would have been more likely to act on PFAS. PFAS reg-
ulation is thus a plausible area where the Trump administration may 
be saving regulatory costs. It is, however, impossible to say exactly 
what savings there might be from lax PFAS regulation. Obviously, 
the Trump EPA may still act, which introduces inherent uncertainty. 
It seems unlikely that PFAS regulatory costs would be hugely signifi-
cant, let alone that the difference in Trump and Clinton EPA regula-
tory costs would be substantial. A much more profound uncertainty 
arises from the fact that the Trump EPA’s inaction is leading states to 
regulate PFAS on their own.176 If Trump administration inaction 
leads individual states to impose stricter regulations than the Clinton 
administration would have, it is entirely possible that PFAS regulato-
ry costs could end up higher under the Trump administration than 
they would have been under a Clinton administration. 
2.  The case for “soft” effects of deregulation 
There is a widespread assumption among both policy profession-
als and the public at large that regulation has decreased under Presi-
dent Trump.177 Many policy professionals argue that the Trump ad-
ministration has not actually reversed many Obama-era rules, but 
rather, that the slowing of new rules is making a major difference.178 
 
 175.  See U.S. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: PFOA & PFOS DRINKING WATER 
HEALTH ADVISORIES, (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents 
/drinkingwaterhealthadvisories_pfoa_pfos_updated_5.31.16.pdf. 
 176.  See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, States Aren’t Waiting for the Trump Admin-




 177.  See, e.g., Government, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/27286/government 
.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2020). 
 178.  See, e.g., New Report Grades Trump Record on Deregulation, AM. COUNCIL FOR 
CAP. FORMATION (Mar. 13, 2019), http://accf.org/2019/03/13/new-report-grades-trump-
record-on-deregulation/ (“The flow of new regulations has diminished significantly in Presi-
dent Trump’s first two years in office. . . .”); see also Danny Vinik, Under Trump, Regulation 
Slows to a Crawl, POLITICO (June 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/ 
2017/06/07/trump-regulation-slowdown-000446. (“The ‘two-for-one’ order, signed January 
30, applies only to ‘significant’ regulations with an economic impact exceeding $100 million or 
meeting other specified criteria, and it may be working in a counterintuitive way: Although it 
was touted as a way to roll back old rules, its main impact appears to be simply erecting obsta-
cles to new regulations.”). 
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The empirical case for this phenomenon rests on two points: (1) 
there has been a significant increase in business investment under 
President Trump, and (2) the increase is not solely due to other fac-
tors such as the tax cuts enacted into law at the end of 2017. From a 
comparison of the evolution of business investment in the U.S. and 
the European Union over 2017 in particular, one could make the case 
for as much as $58 billion in annual increased investment from de-
regulation. 
 a.  Increase in gross business investment.  One would expect that a 
decrease in regulation would spur entrepreneurship, and the data does 
indicate increased business formation since the 2016 election. From the 
fourth quarter of 2016 to the first quarter of 2019, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly business formation increased from 74,288 to 78,130, having 
peaked in the first quarter of 2018 at 81,960.179 
Gross business investment has similarly increased significantly 
under President Trump, from a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 
$3.246 trillion at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2016 to 
$3.783 trillion at the end of the fourth quarter in 2018.180 That dif-
ference, $537 billion, provides a convenient rough limit on how 
much Trump deregulation could have helped the economy.181 That 
figure obviously dwarfs the hard estimates of regulatory savings dis-
cussed above, which topped out at about $1 billion. 
 b.  Accounting for the 2017 tax cuts and non-deregulatory factors.  
Of course, even a partisan Trump supporter could not reasonably claim 
all of that increase is due to deregulation. According to nonpartisan 
studies, the 2017 tax cuts resulted in a decrease in annual tax revenue of 
about $164 billion.182 Over the course of 2018, business investment 
increased by $254 billion.183 However, the tax cuts did not take effect 
 
 179.  FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, GROSS PRIVATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GPDI [hereinafter FED. RESERVE BANK]. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Private domestic investment would not, of course, include agency regulatory savings 
(i.e., the lower cost to the agencies of enforcing fewer rules or of lessening enforcement of ex-
isting rules), but those are so small compared to $537 billion that they can be safely ignored. 
 182.  Howard Gleckman, The Price of Tax Cuts and Spending Hikes, TAX POLICY CTR. 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/price-tax-cuts-and-spending-hikes. 
 183.  FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179. 
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until the first quarter of 2018,184 so we can at least somewhat isolate 
deregulatory effects by examining investment increases from the fourth 
quarter of 2016 (measured October 1, 2016, roughly five weeks before 
the election) through the fourth quarter of 2017. Over that period, gross 
business investment increased by $296 billion.185 
 
  Fig. 1—U.S. quarterly gross private domestic investment; 
highlighted section is fourth quarter 2016 through fourth quar-
ter 2017. 
 
What share of that increase can be plausibly attributed to deregu-
lation? Obviously, the global economy has so many influences that 
truly isolating the role of deregulation is practically impossible. 
However, we can make a reasoned guess by comparing U.S. econom-
ic performance to that of the European Union, a similarly sized first-
world economy.186 While business investment was increasing in the 
United States, it was also increasing in the European Union, which 
was not in the midst of a particular deregulatory push.187 
 
 184.  Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, Title I, Sec. 111001(a), 115 Stat. 2054. 
 185.  FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179. 
 186.  See generally WORLD BANK, GDP (CURRENT US$) - EUROPEAN UNION, 
UNITED STATES, CHINA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?loca-
tions=EU-US-CN (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
 187.  Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
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As measured by the OECD, investment increased by 4% in the 
United States in 2017, and 3.1% in the European Union.188 Because 
we are seeking the maximum possible estimate, we will ascribe the 
entire difference between U.S. and E.U. business investment in that 
year to “soft” deregulatory effects. With that assumption, about 23% 
of the $296 billion increase in U.S. business investment can be at-
tributed to deregulation. That corresponds to about $68 billion over 
five quarters, or an annualized increase of $54 billion. 
3.  The evidence against “soft” deregulatory effects under Trump. 
There are broadly two categories of evidence against “soft” de-
regulatory effects under Trump: data suggesting the increase in busi-
ness investment was due to factors other than deregulation, and data 
suggesting that actual deregulation under President Trump has been 
less substantive than one would expect. One would expect “soft” ef-
fects to arise from the collective experience of regulated companies, 
and if the individuals at those companies do not actually see changes 
in regulation, it is less likely that they would change their behavior 
(i.e., increase business investment) in response to the deregulatory 
agenda. These considerations suggest that “soft” effects are likely 
negligible. 
 a.  Business investment increases under Trump are almost exactly 
ordinary.  From the fourth quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter 
2017, gross business investment increased on average 1.7% per 
quarter.189 While this represents a solid increase, it is not particularly 
remarkable. If we zoom out to examine all gross private domestic 
investment figures since 1947, the average is almost exactly the growth 
seen under President Trump: 1.8% quarterly.190 Recent presidents have 
not deviated substantially from that trend. Average gross business 
 
dicator-d1e17930 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) (describing a push toward better regulation that 
began in 2015). 
 188.  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INVESTMENT (GFCF), https://data.oecd.org/gdp/investment-gfcf.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 
2020).  
 189.  FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, NET DOMESTIC INVESTMENT: PRIVATE: 
DOMESTIC BUSINESS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W790RC1Q027SBEA (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2020).  
 190.  FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179. 
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investment increase under President Obama was 1.6%t per quarter.191 
The 0.1% difference is entirely due to the first two quarters under 
President Obama, when investment was still decreasing in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis. If those first two quarters are omitted, 
President Obama’s average is 2.0%. It is difficult to see a deregulatory 
benefits increase when business investment increase was essentially 
unchanged. 
Another way to look at the data is to see how often, over five con-
secutive quarters, business investment performed similarly under 
President Obama to how it did under President Trump in 2017. 
There were twenty-seven periods of five consecutive quarters in 
President Obama’s presidency, excluding the last quarter, where the 
supposed soft effects of Trump’s election would have started. Of the 
twenty-seven possible sets of five quarters, twenty-one saw growth 
higher than the first five quarters under President Trump.192 Put an-
other way, business investment growth under President Trump dur-
ing the likeliest period for “soft” deregulatory benefits would have 
been an unusually slow period of business investment growth under 
President Obama. 
One more point from business investment data: one of the clear-
est predictors of a large increase in business investment in any given 
quarter is a decrease in the quarters preceding it.193 Business invest-
ment was down throughout much of 2016. Ergo, it would be reason-
able to expect that under any president, business investment would 
have increased in 2017. 
 b.  Business confidence is not disproportionately higher in the 
United States than in Europe.  A number of observers have suggested 
that business confidence has increased under Trump, and data from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
bears this out.194 However, business confidence increased slightly more 
in OECD countries in Europe than in the United States during the 
 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Since 2010, there has not been more than two consecutive quarters of decreasing 
gross private domestic investment. 
 194.  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BUSINESS 
CONFIDENCE INDEX (BCI) [hereinafter OECD, BCI], https://data.oecd.org/leadind/business-
confidence-index-bci.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
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Trump administration to date, and both started decreasing significantly 
around October 2018.195 The chart below shows the time period of our 
particular interest, November 2016 to January 1, 2018, plus some 
context before and after. OECD adjusts this data so that 100 is the long-
run historical average, and the U.S. was almost exactly at its historical 
average in November 2016. Note that the beginning of the increase in 
U.S. business confidence predates President Trump’s election by about 
two months. Business confidence in the European OECD countries 
increased 0.97 points from December 2016 to December 2017, and rose 
by 0.96 points in the U.S.196 
 
Fig. 2 —OECD monthly business confidence index. 
The correlation coefficient between Europe’s and the United 
States’ business confidence in the OECD data is about 0.52 dating 
back to December 1976.197 That falls between a medium-strength 
and a strong association. While business confidence in the United 
States and Europe can move in different directions at different 
speeds, they tend to stay relatively close to one another. 
 
 195.  Id. OECD countries generally comprise the larger, wealthier countries in Europe. 
See “Member countries”, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/. 
 196.  OECD, BCI supra note 194. 
 197.  OECD, BCI supra note 194. Pearson correlation coefficient calculated by Excel us-
ing OECD data. 
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If the maximum benefits scenario were in fact happening, we 
would probably expect Europe and the United States to diverge 
somewhat in business confidence. It makes sense that booming busi-
ness from deregulation would spill over to Europe somewhat, but it is 
improbable that the Europeans would be precisely as enthused about 
their economic outlook as the United States. While economic growth 
is not zero-sum, if nothing else, European manufacturers would suf-
fer somewhat in the short run from the success of their U.S. competi-
tors. Confounding outside factors could lead to this evidence, howev-
er, and there is an increase in business confidence in the United 
States at the time we are most concerned about. It is thus possible 
that business confidence could be about the same in the United 
States and Europe when a huge deregulation-led boom is happening 
in the United States, but it seems unlikely. 
 c.  Enforcement of existing regulations not obviously lower than it 
might have been under Clinton.  We have so far considered only the 
effect of explicitly changing rules through formal agency rulemaking. 
However, one could imagine a lack of enforcement by regulators as 
constituting de facto deregulation. Various cabinet officials have seemed 
to signal this sort of approach, perhaps best exemplified by former EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt.198 EPA’s annual inspections and evaluations 
reached a 21st-century low of 10,612 in 2018.199 
However, when one examines enforcement data from the EPA, 
the enforcement story becomes less clear. The EPA’s annual inspec-
tions and evaluations had been consistently trending downward since 
2012.200 Civil penalties against polluters hit a twenty-five-year low in 
2018, but 2017 saw the second-highest level of civil penalties over 
that same time period.201 Civil and criminal cases initiated by the 
EPA under President Trump were also lower than in Obama’s years, 
but not radically so.202 The value of pollution control expenditures 
 
 198.  Abigail Tracy, E.P.A. Purges Scientist, Plans to Replace them with Industry Reps, 
VANITY FAIR (May 8, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/epa-scott-pruitt-
scientists-dismissed. 
 199.  ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, LESS ENFORCEMENT: COMMUNITIES 
AT RISK 1 (2019) [hereinafter EIP], http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/ up-
loads/2019/02/EIP-Enforcement-Report.pdf. 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id. at 2. 
 202.  Id. at 3. 
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required by consent decree plummeted in 2018, but was at near rec-
ord-high levels in 2017.203 
Data can, of course, mislead. There is a plethora of accounts of 
the Trump-era EPA declining to prosecute offenders. It may be that 
the EPA is enforcing existing rules selectively, essentially running up 
the score on small offenders while letting larger offenders off the 
hook. 
The reasonable conclusion to draw from the anecdotal and data 
evidence is that it is not clear whether deregulation by lack of en-
forcement is happening, at least at the EPA. Lack of enforcement 
would be an unwieldy way to accrue regulatory benefits, particularly 
because firms cannot reasonably plan on lack of enforcement so long 
as some enforcement actions are taking place. 
 d.  Judicial review is weakening the deregulatory effort.  A rule can 
be finalized and go into effect only to be overturned by judicial review. 
In the context of analyzing reductions to the “regulatory burden,” we 
obviously should not count deregulatory acts that are overturned by the 
courts.204 Every administration faces the problem of judicial review, but 
it has proven particularly irksome to Trump administration 
environmental deregulatory actions. 
Many observers have offered anecdotal analyses suggesting the 
Trump administration is losing arbitrary and capricious review court 
cases more often than the Obama administration did.205 I decided to 
check that common assumption with an empirical review. I reviewed 
323 cases from the Trump and Obama administrations involving a 
ruling on whether a proposed EPA or Department of the Interior 
(DOI) rule was arbitrary and capricious.206 Trump’s DOI won 69% 
 
 203.  Id. at 4. 
 204.  There could be savings from deregulatory actions overturned by judicial review if 
enforcement of the rule is stayed while the case is ongoing. Those savings would likely be mar-
ginal because the regulated entities cannot rely on the regulation being repealed. They might 
be able to delay investments in compliance, but that would merely “save” the interest on the 
funds that otherwise would have been spent earlier. 
 205.  See, e.g., Fred Barbash and Deanna Paul, The real reason the Trump administration 
is constantly losing in court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-
court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html. 
 206.  I chose EPA and DOI because both engage in the kind of environmental rule-
makings that are paradigmatic of the “regulatory burden.” DOI’s ambit is far larger than EPA’s, 
including, among other things, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and oversight of fisheries. 
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of cases and Obama’s won 59%. However, Obama’s EPA won 70% 
of its cases. As of May 12, 2019, Trump’s EPA has won only 50%. 
Of course, the dividing line between the presidencies blurs 
somewhat because court cases lag behind administrations. Thus, 
many of the cases in 2017 related to rules that originated in the 
Obama administration. As time has worn on, the Trump administra-
tion has won fewer cases. Across both agencies, the Trump admin-
istration won two-thirds of its arbitrary and capricious cases in 2017, 
slightly less than that in 2018, and only 50% in 2019 to date. 
Overall, the Trump administration does not necessarily have any 
more severe a judicial review problem than previous administrations. 
However, environmental rules specifically are less likely to survive 
judicial review under President Trump than under President Obama. 
Because environmental rules constitute a large portion of potential 
deregulatory savings, deregulatory savings are likely to be lower in 
the long-run than they appear at first glance. The EPA under Admin-
istrator Pruitt endured anecdotal criticism for ineffectiveness, partial-
ly because major deregulatory efforts were overturned by judicial re-
view.207 
The legal troubles of the deregulatory efforts are already baked 
into the estimate of “hard” deregulatory savings. However, given that 
legal troubles seem to be getting worse as the Trump administration 
continues, judicial review is an independent reason to further dis-
count the potential savings of major non-finalized actions such as the 
repeal and replacement of the CPP, the redefinition of WOTUS, 
and the freezing of CAFE and CO2 standards for cars. 
 
 207.  See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, The Myth of Scott Pruitt’s EPA Rollback, POLITICO 
(Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/07/scott-pruitt-epa-
accomplishments-rollback-217834. 
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 e.  Trump deregulatory actions are leading states to impose new 
regulations.  State regulation greatly complicates the effort to assess 
“soft” deregulatory costs. States like California, disagreeing with federal 
deregulatory efforts, have begun developing their own regulations, in 
some cases stricter than what the pre-Trump standard was. CAFE 
standards, limits on CO2 emissions, WOTUS, and PFAS regulation are 
all areas where deregulatory savings are being reduced, eliminated 
entirely, or even winding up greater than they were before or otherwise 
would have been. 
Some of these state-led efforts may be overruled in court based 
on claims of federal preemption.208 Such determinations would have 
to be made on a case-by-case basis, however. Thus, marginal business 
investment will likely be deterred if that investment is contingent 
both on the federal deregulatory rule surviving judicial review and 
the corresponding state-led regulation being overturned. 
fffK==qÜÉ=jÉ~åáåÖ=çÑ=aÉêÉÖìä~íáçå=
We set out to establish whether deregulation has meaningfully 
contributed to economic growth, and the answer appears to be no. 
Bluntly, the cost savings from President Trump’s deregulatory acts 
have been trivial, particularly when compared to other federal inter-
ventions in the economy. For example, federal spending increased by 
$127 billion from 2017 to 2018.209 Even with the major tax cut at the 
end of 2017, federal receipts increased by about $14 billion.210 As dis-
cussed earlier, tariffs imposed on China and other major trading 
partners likely cost at least $7.8 billion annually, and possibly as 
much as $63 billion. The administration has promised $16 billion in 
trade aid to farmers, suggesting that the trade war has inflicted at 
least that much in costs.211 If the headlines proclaiming $86 billion in 
regulatory savings were credible, the deregulatory agenda might 
 
 208.  Environmental & Energy Law Program Staff, CAFE Standards and the California 
Preemption Plan, ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM HARV. L. SCH. (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/cafe-standards-and-the-california-preemption-plan/. 
 209.  U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES tbl1.1, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.  
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Ana Swanson, Trump Gives Farmers $6 Billion in Aide Amid Prolonged China 
Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/farm-aid-package.html. 
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compensate for trade headwinds. However, $3.3 billion annually 
would not meaningfully alter the trajectory of the economy. 
While this article is focused on providing a neutral empirical 
analysis of President Trump’s deregulation, that analysis raises relat-
ed questions which merit further discussion and which are difficult to 
discuss empirically: 
 
To what extent does this article’s analysis undermine the idea of 
deregulation producing economically significant cost savings, even 
outside of the context of the Trump administration?  
Is the Trump administration pursuing an optimal deregulatory 
strategy? 
Using lessons learned through the empirical analysis of this arti-
cle, we can at least make some progress in answering these questions. 
A.  Significant Deregulatory Savings are Possible, but Not Easily 
Achieved. 
Deregulation can produce significant cost savings, but is paradox-
ically less likely to do so if pursued with a monomaniacal focus on 
cost-cutting. A simple example helps elucidate the point: if the EPA 
rescinded rules against adding tetraethyl lead to gasoline, fuel econ-
omy and engine performance would likely increase, saving business 
and consumers billions of dollars.212 However, virtually no one advo-
cates for the reintroduction of leaded gasoline. One obvious reason is 
that the benefits of lead regulation far outweigh the costs—lead in 
the environment can cause trillions of dollars in losses from prema-
ture deaths, lowered intelligence, and increased propensity to vio-
lence. But, given the focus on regulatory costs and skepticism of ben-
efits exhibited by anti-regulatory commentators, why would the 
Trump administration not propose deregulation of gasoline addi-
tives? 
1.  Ignoring benefits triggers stronger reaction from courts and state 
governments. 
One can better understand the path to lower regulatory costs by 
 
 212.  See Tim Harford, Why Did We Use Leaded Petrol for So Long?, BBC (Aug. 28, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-40593353.  
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considering the factors we observed that whittled down the “soft” de-
regulatory effects of President Trump’s deregulatory efforts. If the 
federal government proposed a cessation of lead regulation, state 
governments would surely intervene, diluting the cost savings from 
the federal government ceasing lead regulation. A multiplicity of law-
suits would likely lead courts to first stay, then overturn the deregula-
tory rule entirely. The auto and engine manufacturers who might 
have benefited from the deregulation would not have the regulatory 
certainty necessary to actually profit from the deregulation of lead. In 
a simple model of the rulemaking process, we imagine that the EPA 
can act in a mostly unconstrained manner to reduce regulatory costs. 
However, in reality, federal agencies, states, and courts all have some 
share of power. Unilateral action simply does not work, even in the 
short-term. 
The factors discussed earlier in the article underscore the weak-
ness of the cost-obsessive focus, most notably intervention by the ju-
diciary and state governments. There is ample reason to believe that 
a focus solely on costs will lead to deregulatory actions that dispro-
portionately fail in court and within state governments. Courts gen-
erally evaluate challenges to regulatory action under the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of the APA. While formal numerical cost-
benefit analysis is not required under that standard, failure to consid-
er an important factor is grounds for overturning a rulemaking.213 
Entirely ignoring regulatory benefits would clearly be a failure to 
consider an important factor. 
State governments systematically weaken the value of deregulato-
ry action because of immediate political reality and the economic 
consequences of federalism. The political reality is that California is 
more pro-regulation than the country as a whole, and its economy is 
large enough that most companies cannot afford to ignore the Cali-
fornia market. Thus, California has a veto of sorts in many areas of 
regulation. The federal government can attempt to preempt state 
regulation, but the prospects of success for preemption vary depend-
ing on the field. 
More broadly, the economics of deregulation are such that com-
panies can only enjoy the benefits to the extent that they are still able 
 
 213.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
396 
to follow regulations in the markets in which they want to participate. 
For individual firms, the value of federal deregulation is often less 
than the value of participating in the California market. That dynam-
ic suggests an increasing gap between federal and state regulatory 
goals leads to decreasing deregulatory savings from federal action. 
2.  Deregulatory “savings” require strategies deeper than simple 
reaction. 
Courts and state governments mobilize to oppose deregulation 
that is directly framed as a partisan rejection of their values. All of the 
largest Trump deregulatory actions are rejecting Obama administra-
tion initiatives, and almost all of those deregulatory actions are reject-
ing initiatives from 2015 or later. The Clean Power Plan, redefinition 
of WOTUS, new CAFE and CO2 emission standards for vehicles—
the Trump administration is targeting all of them, and in each case 
the administration’s efforts are being weakened or undermined en-
tirely by courts or state governments. States have created regional in-
itiatives to lower CO2 emissions in the absence of the Clean Power 
Plan;214 the prospects for the WOTUS redefinition in court remain 
murky;215 and as we just discussed, California is almost single-
handedly undoing the new CAFE and CO2 emission standards for 
vehicles. 
If courts and state governments are key obstacles to a deregulato-
ry agenda, a wise deregulatory strategy would decrease the likelihood 
of their involvement. Repeal of recent opposition party initiatives in-
creases the likelihood of intervention by courts and state govern-
ments. Repeal of recent rules will necessarily be high-profile and di-
visive, and consequently there will be more lawsuits filed against such 
repeals. The repeal effort will likely engender partisan disagreement, 
raising the probability that state-level opposition party lawmakers 
will act immediately to counteract the action’s effects. 
While a full empirical analysis would be necessary to evaluate 
when courts and state government interpose themselves in federal 
regulation, there are some obvious ways to avoid their intervention. 
First, if Congress acts instead of agencies on their own, the main ave-
 
 214.  See "The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative", https://www.rggi.org/. 
 215.  See Pamela King, Wotus lawsuits start long, muddy legal battle, E&E News, Oct. 
24, 2019, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061365079. 
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nue for judicial review—arbitrary and capricious review—is nullified. 
Congressional acts are not subject to arbitrary and capricious review. 
Congress can also manifest an intention for federal law to supersede 
state law in a particular field, making state intervention much more 
difficult. Second, if the administration must act without Congress, it 
should target areas outside of immediate public interest. For example, 
if the public is focused and aware of rules relating to climate change, 
regulatory activity relating to climate change will prompt the public 
to pressure state legislators to pass countervailing laws or litigation-
focused advocacy groups to file lawsuits. Third, to the extent possi-
ble, agencies should present their actions as modifications of previous 
rules, not wholesale repeal. That will tend to lower the psychological 
salience of the action and reduce confrontation.216 
These recommendations may evince cynicism about the regulato-
ry process, but they actually correspond to broad theories of how the 
regulatory system should work. Congress’s will should provoke less 
partisan reaction than an agency’s because it more closely represents 
the will of the people. The further an issue is from immediate public 
scrutiny, the more appropriate it is for a technocratic agency to ad-
dress it. When an agency must act to change an existing regulation, 
proceeding incrementally is less likely to create vast disruptions or 
new unintended consequences. Thus, good politics and good policy 
are fairly well aligned when it comes to regulatory agendas. 
3.  Potential lessons from flawed studies. 
There are a number of flaws in NAM’s $2 trillion annual regula-
tory costs study, but the kernel of truth within it is that improving 
the regulatory process can lead to larger savings than repeal of a dis-
crete set of rules. Recall that the methodology of NAM’s 2014 report 
rests on extrapolating a proportional increase in GDP from an in-
crease in reported business satisfaction with the regulatory system. 
While the methodology that led to the $2 trillion result was doubt-
lessly flawed, business satisfaction with the regulatory system was 
measured by survey questions relating to regulatory process more 
 
 216.  Cf. Mark R. Leary, Emotional Responses to Interpersonal Rejection, 17 
DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 435, 439 (Dec. 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4734881/ (describing rejection as triggering anger as a way to “prevent, 
terminate, or punish specific behaviors that are perceived as an immediate threat.”) 
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than substance.217 
The failure to address process generally stems from a lack of po-
litical will, not a lack of clear areas for improvement. For example, 
multiple offices within the same agency often administer the same 
program.218 Failure to coordinate federal actions with state and local 
governments also leads to multiplication of paperwork and costs for 
businesses.219 Cost-benefit analysis standards are weak and vary across 
the federal government.220 Businesses frequently complain about a 
lack of transparency in the permitting process.221 All of these prob-
lems could be solved, whether through legislation, executive order, or 
coordinated regulatory action. At the federal level, there have been 
many efforts over various administrations to increase regulatory effi-
ciency.222 While these efforts have varied in success, none has funda-
mentally addressed chokepoints in the process. 
B.  What is the Objective of the Trump Administration’s 
Deregulatory Strategy? 
The above analysis suggests that the Trump administration’s de-
 
 217.  W. MARK CRAIN AND NICOLE V. CRAIN, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION 
TO THE U.S. ECONOMY, MANUFACTURING AND SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT FOR THE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS 68 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20150323014159/https://www.nam.org/data-and-reports/cost-of-federal-regulations/federal-
regulation-full-study.pdf.  
 218.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-285SP, 2019 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2019), https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-19-285SP/.  
 219.  See id. 
 220.  See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS 
REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (Dec. 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R41974.pdf (“An OMB report indicated that independent regulatory agencies provided 
some information [on] costs and benefits in 76 of the 118 major rules they issued from FY2003 
to FY2012. Cabinet departments and other agencies estimated monetary costs and benefits for 
some, but not all, of their rules.”). 
 221.  See, e.g., William D. Eggers and Pankaj Kishnani, Compliance Without Tears: Im-
proving the Government-to-Business Experience, DELOITTE (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/industry/public-sector/relationship-between-
government-and-business-customer-experience.html (repeatedly emphasizing business com-
plaints about lack of regulatory transparency). 
 222.  See Stuart Shapiro and Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Re-
form Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2016), http://www.nyujlpp.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Shapiro-Moran-Regulatory-Reform-Since-the-APA-
19nyujlpp141.pdf (describing the failure of regulatory reforms such as the Regulatory Flexibil-
ity Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, and the Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act).  
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regulatory strategy was poorly conceived if the objective was maxim-
izing savings. However, as a concluding note, it is worth discussing 
potential structural reasons why the administration has followed its 
chosen path. Putting aside for the moment criticisms based on in-
competence, the Trump administration has not initiated any signifi-
cant effort to change the regulatory process.223 The issue is thus not 
one of competence, but of strategy. To judge whether the Trump 
administration’s strategy is sound, we must consider how we measure 
success. This article has demonstrated the strong likelihood that if 
the Trump administration is seeking to lower regulatory costs 
enough to drive economic growth, it has not succeeded. However, 
the deregulatory agenda can serve many functions other than lower-
ing cost. I will review a few possible functions of the current deregu-
latory agenda, though I stress that the true objective is unknown and 
likely a combination of multiple factors. 
1.  Keeping the Republican Party unified 
The importance of the deregulatory agenda may be its signaling 
value to wavering Republican elites. As many observers have noted, 
President Trump has challenged Republican Party orthodoxy on is-
sues like trade. Because the notion of a deregulatory agenda primarily 
dates back to President Reagan in the minds of most Republican 
elites, it is comforting for otherwise skeptical Republicans that Presi-
dent Trump seems to pay homage to this part of the Republican plat-
form. 
If the intent of the deregulatory strategy is to visibly signal adher-
ence to reducing the role of the federal government, it makes perfect 
sense to attempt to repeal high-profile regulations from the Obama 
administration. To modern-day Republicans almost twenty years re-
moved from the Clinton administration, Obama-era initiatives con-
stitute the most visible example of regulatory cost, even if they do not 
impose particularly massive costs on an economy-wide scale. Subse-
quent intervention by the judiciary and state governments does not 
 
 223.  Arguably, the administration’s most significant attempt at process reform is ignoring 
co-benefits in environmental rules. While that change impacts multiple rules, it is best under-
stood as an attempt to make specific substantive deregulatory actions easier, especially those 
relating to climate change. By its very nature, this change will not affect regulatory costs for 
anyone based on process. It can only affect regulatory costs by making particular rules easier to 
repeal. 
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affect the efficacy of the signal the Trump administration gives to 
Republicans when it loudly declares that it is repealing the Clean 
Power Plan. 
2.  Providing an alternative explanation for economic growth 
The Trump administration has enjoyed a period of consistent 
economic growth, albeit one that does not appear radically different 
from growth periods in the Bush or Obama administrations. To 
claim credit for that economic growth, the Trump administration 
and its supporters must point to some policy change. The tax cuts did 
not go into effect until 2018, so the cuts cannot explain the growth. 
The other major legislative policy initiative of the Trump administra-
tion, healthcare reform, collapsed in 2017. What other administra-
tion policy could be credited for the growth? Because deregulatory 
benefits are hard to measure, they provide a facially plausible expla-
nation for growth, particularly if partisan estimates place savings doz-
ens of times higher than neutral analyses. The use of deregulation as 
a plausible and difficult-to-disprove factor would explain why Repub-
licans do not seem particularly interested in discovering the actual 
amount of deregulatory savings, but still cite deregulation to explain 
economic growth. 
3.  Pleasing specific constituencies 
The deregulatory initiatives to date have not created economical-
ly significant savings on a nationwide scale, but the hard and soft 
benefits are often focused among favored constituencies. While re-
peal of the Clean Power Plan and replacement with the Affordable 
Clean Energy rule does not produce major savings, what savings it 
does produce are focused among coal producers and coal plant opera-
tors. For a variety of sociological reasons outside the purview of this 
article, people involved in the coal industry are perceived to be a key 
part of President Trump’s base of support in Rust Belt” states. 
Even more specifically, while the coal industry as a whole has 
continued to shed plants and employment despite President Trump’s 
support, specific coal companies have profited from close relation-
ships with regulators within the Trump administration.224 Those 
 
 224.  Lisa Friedman, How a Coal Baron’s Wish List Became President Trump’s To-Do 
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companies can enjoy significant benefits from deregulation even if 
the overall regulatory benefit is low. This theory is further bolstered 
by President Trump’s first EPA director, Scott Pruitt, becoming a 
lobbyist for an Indiana coal company soon after leaving the EPA.225 
4.  Ideological/psychological salience of specific regulatory issues 
Many of the major regulatory issues taken on by the Trump ad-
ministration provoke the strongest partisan divide. For example, 
President Trump has repeatedly stated he does not believe in climate 
change, or believes that it might change back without human inter-
vention. Democrats have complained frequently about the Presi-
dent’s views. Even if the President does not particularly care about 
climate change, he may direct his agency heads to repeal climate 
change-related regulations simply to spite his opponents. 
While this explanation may be simplistic, it helps to explain the 
administration’s refusal to act incrementally in virtually any regulato-
ry field despite the obvious vulnerabilities of acting in an all-or-
nothing fashion. For example, the automobile industry is now in the 
awkward position of opposing the administration’s CAFE and CO2 
standards because they do not want extreme actions to provoke a Cal-
ifornian backlash.226 Another example: the administration declared 
almost all offshore land available for oil and natural gas leases despite 
protests from nearly every coastal state, including Republican-leaning 
states.227 These actions sound like a one-sentence directive designed 
for a press release, not a clever deregulatory plan that could actually 
go into effect. 
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 225.  Emily Hopkins, Scott Pruitt Left the EPA Mired in Scandal. Now He is Lobbying 
Indiana Lawmakers., INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Apr. 19, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.indystar.com 
/story/news/environment/2019/04/18/scott-pruitt-now-lobbyist-indiana-
legislature/3511759002/.  
 226.  See Robinson Meyer, How the Carmakers Trumped Themselves, ATLANTIC (Jun. 
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tions, ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trumps-
offshore-drilling-plan-is-roiling-coastal-elections/566726/. 
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
402 
`çåÅäìëáçå=
The overall level of federal regulation has been a focus of Repub-
lican politics for decades. However, because Democrats are generally 
more interested in individual regulations than overall levels, the actu-
al study of regulations writ large has become one-sided and atro-
phied. The lax standards of regulatory estimates allow for all manner 
of hyperbole, which reinforces the fear of the political right that 
regulations are imposing massive costs. That fear leads to broad at-
tempts at deregulation that are weakened by state and judicial inter-
vention. A more accurate understanding of regulatory costs would be 
an important first step toward a more coherent, effective regulatory 
agenda. 
 
